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MONEYBALL SENTENCING 
DAWINDER S. SIDHU* 
Abstract: Sentencing is a backward- and forward-looking enterprise. That is, sen-
tencing is informed by an individual’s past conduct as well as by the criminal jus-
tice system’s prediction of the individual’s future criminal conduct. Increasingly, 
the criminal justice system is making these predictions on an actuarial basis, 
computing the individual’s risk of recidivism according to the rates of recidivism 
for people possessing the same group characteristics (e.g., race, sex, socio-
economic status, education). The sentencing community is drawn to this statisti-
cal technique because it purportedly distinguishes with greater accuracy the high-
risk from the low-risk, and thereby allows for a more efficient allocation of sen-
tencing resources, reserving incarceration for the truly dangerous and saving the 
low-risk from needless penal attention. Despite these asserted benefits, risk-
assessment tools are exogenous to the theories of punishment, the very founda-
tion for sentencing in Anglo-American jurisprudence. This Article reviews the 
legality and propriety of actuarial predictive instruments, using these theories and 
governing constitutional and statutory law as the touchstone for this analysis. 
This Article then applies these normative and legal principles to seventeen major 
characteristics that may comprise an offender’s composite risk profile. It argues 
that risk-assessment instruments are problematic for three reasons: they include 
characteristics that are prohibited by constitutional and statutory law; subject the 
individual to punishment for characteristics over which the individual has no 
meaningful control; and presume that the individual is a static entity predisposed, 
if not predetermined, to recidivate, thereby undermining individual agency and 
betting against the individual’s ability to beat the odds. 
INTRODUCTION 
Moneyball reveals how the Oakland Athletics upended the conventional 
approach by which major league baseball teams predicted future player per-
                                                                                                                           
 © 2015, Dawinder S. Sidhu. All rights reserved. 
 * Associate Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law. My thanks to Geoff 
Cheshire, Jeffrey Minear, Max Minzner, Brent Newton, and workshop participants at the Georgetown 
University Law Center’s Center for the Constitution and Stanford Law School’s Constitutional Law 
Center for helpful comments and conversations; and to the exceptional staff of Boston College Law 
Review, especially Benjamin Ernst, Bryan Curran, Andrew Haile, Eric Hawkins, and Michael Welsh, 
for improving the Article’s quality. This Article was prepared during the author’s time as a Supreme 
Court Fellow at the U.S. Sentencing Commission. The views expressed herein do not represent the 
positions of the Court or the Commission. Those views, and any errors, rest with the author alone. 
672 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:671 
formance.1 Traditionally, these teams projected player performance through 
intuition and observation,2 without much regard to statistics.3 In 2002, the 
budget-conscious Athletics sought a different assessment method, one that 
would “minimize risk.”4 The Athletics turned to statistical analyses of past 
player performance as the basis for its predictions of future player perfor-
mance.5 This data-driven approach served as an effective and efficient guide of 
future player performance,6 and was appreciably “better than the hoary alterna-
tive, rendering decisions by gut feeling.”7 The Athletics’ success did not go 
unnoticed. Indeed, its empirical method of predicting performance is now the 
norm in professional baseball.8 
The United States criminal justice system is undergoing a similar transi-
tion.9 Whereas the Athletics tried to predict a player’s future performance, the 
criminal justice system seeks, among other things, to predict a defendant’s fu-
ture dangerousness. As United States Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens 
recognized, “prediction of future criminal conduct is an essential element in 
many of the decisions rendered throughout our criminal justice system,” in-
cluding whether a defendant should be imprisoned and, if so, for how long.10 
These sorts of predictions are, Justice Stevens added, a “task performed count-
less times each day throughout the American system of criminal justice.”11 
Historically, courts have calculated an offender’s risk of recidivism on the 
basis of an impressionistic, “‘seat of the pants’ guess, about ‘what seems about 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See generally MICHAEL LEWIS, MONEYBALL: THE ART OF WINNING AN UNFAIR GAME (2003) 
(recounting the story of the Oakland Athletics baseball team using statistics to predict future player 
performance). 
 2 See id. at 242 (“If you trusted [a pitcher’s numbers], you didn’t have to give two minutes’ 
thought to how a guy looked, or how hard he threw. You could judge a pitcher’s performance objec-
tively, by what he had accomplished.”). 
 3 See id. at 9 (quoting a scout who admitted that he “never looked at a single statistic of Billy’s” 
and noting that Beane’s batting average dropped significantly prior to the draft, yet “scouts never 
considered this”). 
 4 Id. at 136. 
 5 See id. at 241 (“[I]f you focused on the right statistics you could certainly project a guy based on 
[minor league] numbers.”). While Beane is perhaps best-known for the Moneyball approach, its “spir-
itual father” is sportswriter Bill James. See id. at 64–83 (discussing James’ influence). 
 6 See id. at 270 (“In all of Major League Baseball only the New York Yankees won as many 
games as the Oakland A’s. . . . [T]he teams in baseball’s best division . . . finished in inverse order to 
their payrolls, [with the A’s in first place] . . . .”). 
 7 Id. at 136. 
 8 See BENJAMIN BAUMER & ANDREW ZIMBALIST, THE SABERMETRIC REVOLUTION: ASSESSING 
THE GROWTH OF ANALYTICS IN BASEBALL, at ix (2014) (estimating that “over three-quarters of major 
league teams have individuals dedicated to” player analytics). 
 9 See Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy 
of Corrections and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 450 (1992). 
 10 Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 275 (1976) (opinion of Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens). 
 11 Id. at 276. 
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right’ for the case.”12 Mainly for cost reasons,13 however, the criminal justice 
system has been shifting away from this approach. More and more, courts to-
day are adopting the use of risk-assessment tools in sentencing.14 These risk-
assessment tools take information on recidivism rates for groups and use them 
to estimate the risk of recidivism for individuals possessing those same group 
characteristics.15 
Consider an example. A court is considering the appropriate sentence for 
a drug addict from a broken home. Prosecutors present evidence that drug ad-
dicts from broken homes are more likely to recidivate than others. The court 
takes this into account and may give the offender a sentence of imprisonment 
or a harsher prison term precisely because he was identified as a member of 
the higher-risk group. A parole board, possessing similar data, may deny re-
lease to an inmate with the same socio-economic, substance abuse, and family 
traits. By contrast, a sentencer may grant bail to an educated, older white fe-
male, or send her to a diversion program, due to evidence that individuals with 
the same educational, age, race, and gender demographics are less likely to 
recidivate. 
The sentencing community is drawn to these methods because they are 
said to distinguish with greater accuracy the high-risk from the low-risk, and 
thereby allow for the more efficient allocation of sentencing resources.16 For 
example, according to their champions, risk-assessment tools help reserve in-
carceration for the most dangerous and save the low-risk from needlessly lan-
guishing in jail or prison.17 These benefits are particularly attractive in an envi-
ronment in which our prisons are bloated and our political leaders are cost-
conscious. 
                                                                                                                           
 12 Paul H. Robinson, One Perspective on Sentencing Reform in the United States, 8 CRIM. L.F. 1, 
4 (1997). Robinson, a member of the inaugural U.S. Sentencing Commission, further explains that, 
“More often than not, this judgment involves no analysis” and that “judges give a particular kind of 
sentence in a particular case because ‘that is the way it has always been done.’” Id. at 4–5. 
 13 See John Monahan & Jennifer L. Skeem, Risk Redux: The Resurgence of Risk Assessment in 
Criminal Sanctioning, 26 FED. SENT’G REP. 158, 158 (2014) (explaining that “[m]oney appears to be 
the principal answer” for “the sudden return of risk to a place of penalogical prominence”). 
 14 See John Monahan, Violence Risk Assessment: Scientific Validity and Evidentiary Admissibil-
ity, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 901, 905–06 (2000) (“[T]he field of ‘violence risk assessment’ has seen 
a dramatic shift away from studies attempting to validate the accuracy of clinical predictions, and 
toward studies attempting to isolate specific risk factors that are actuarially (meaning statistically) 
associated with violence.”). 
 15 See Robert A. Prentky et al., Sexually Violent Predators in the Courtroom, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. 
POL’Y & L. 357, 370 (2006) (defining risk-assessments as “empirically derived mechanical rules for 
combining information to produce a quantitative estimate of risk”). 
 16 See Monahan, supra note 14, at 905–06. 
 17 See Roger K. Warren, Evidence-Based Sentencing: The Application of Principles of Evidence-
Based Practice to State Sentencing Practice and Policy, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 585, 588 (2009). 
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It may come as no surprise, therefore, that at least twenty states are using 
some form of actuarial risk-assessments.18 In addition, prominent legal institu-
tions like the American Law Institute (ALI) and the National Center for State 
Courts have endorsed these tools.19 Indeed, ALI’s draft revisions to the Model 
Penal Code would require state sentencing commissions to use risk-assessment 
instruments.20 Accordingly, courts’ daily predictions about criminal defendants 
future behavior are now being performed increasingly on the basis of actuarial 
risk-assessments. This trend reveals a growing national acceptance of this sta-
tistical technique.21 
But there is one problem: risk-assessment tools have no legitimate basis 
in any recognized penological theories. As one prominent penologist observes, 
these instruments have “no root, nor any relation to the jurisprudential theories 
of just punishment.”22 Other criminal scholars have similarly noted that “courts 
rarely have had to address jurisprudential considerations in making violence 
risk assessments,” but because “such instruments . . . are being used with in-
creasing frequency in criminal sentencing,” jurisprudential considerations “can 
no longer be avoided . . . .”23 This mismatch between theory and practice can-
not be tolerated any longer. 
                                                                                                                           
 18 See NANCY LEVIGNE ET AL., URBAN INST., JUSTICE REINVESTMENT INITIATIVE STATE AS-
SESSMENT REPORT 39 (2014), available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/412994-Justice-
Reinvestment-Initiative-State-Assessment-Report.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/4357-C9TL
?type=pdf [hereinafter “JUSTICE REINVESTMENT REPORT”]; Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentenc-
ing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 809 (2014). As this 
Article was being prepared for print, Senators John Cornyn and Sheldon Whitehouse introduced a 
bipartisan bill that would require risk-assessments of federal offenders. See S. 467, 114th Cong. 
(2015); News Release, U.S. Sen. John Cornyn, Sens. Cornyn, Whitehouse Introduce Prison Reform 
Legislation (Feb. 10, 2015), available at http://www.cornyn.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=News
Releases&ContentRecord_id=f6840b81-c2dd-4393-8ff9-f7861e79436d, archived at http://perma.cc/
94AW-C2VQ. 
 19 See BRIAN J. OSTROM ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS & VA. CRIM. SENTENCING 
COMM’N, OFFENDER RISK ASSESSMENT IN VIRGINIA 1–2 (2012), available at http://www.vcsc.
virginia.gov/risk_off_rpt.pdf, archived at [https://perma.cc/24BX-ZCCY?type=pdf. 
 20 See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 (Tentative Draft No. 2, Mar. 25, 2011), avail-
able at http://www.ali.org/00021333/Model%20Penal%20Code%20TD%20No%202%20-%20online
%20version.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/7L3V-LHM2?type=pdf [hereinafter “MPC DRAFT”]. 
 21 See Morris B. Hoffman, Emptying Prisons Is no Panacea, USA TODAY (Sept. 30, 2014, 8:44 
PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2014/09/30/emptying-prisons-rehabilitation-deterring-
punishment-column/16508959/, archived at http://perma.cc/S5TH-Z4VS. Evidence-based sentencing 
has been called a “fad.” Id. As these practices are poised to be more prevalent, not less fashionable, 
the question becomes how, not so much whether, they should be used. 
 22 BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN AN 
ACTUARIAL AGE 188 (2007). Indeed, Harcourt argues that, in the context of risk-assessments, effi-
ciency has displaced the theories of punishment as the first principle. See id. at 173–92. 
 23 John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm Among Prisoners, 
Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 434–35 (2006); see John C. Coffee, Jr., The Repressed 
Issues of Sentencing: Accountability, Predictability, and Equality in the Era of the Sentencing Com-
mission, 66 GEO. L.J. 975, 981 (1978) (urging that the sentencing community turn to the “task of 
taming the wild horse of categoric prediction”). 
2015] Actuarial Predictive Instruments in Sentencing 675 
This Article is the first to critically examine the legality and propriety of 
risk-assessment instruments through the lens of widely-accepted theories of 
punishment, and to apply corresponding principles to seventeen major charac-
teristics24 that may inform actuarial risk assessments. This Article argues that 
risk-assessment instruments are problematic for three reasons: 
First, certain group-based characteristics discussed in the risk-assessment 
context—i.e., race, sex, national origin, religion, socio-economic status—are 
forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause or declared 
expressly off-limits by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (“SRA”),25 which 
governs sentencing in the federal courts. 
Second, risk-assessment tools identify risk on the basis of an offender’s 
group membership or group identity, assign the same monolithic risk profile to 
everyone in the group, and premise punishment on group characteristics which 
the individual possesses by accident of birth or cannot otherwise meaningfully 
change. In doing so, risk-assessment tools sever the link between punishment 
and individual conduct, and between punishment and individual control. 
Third, risk-assessment tools effectively consider the offender to be a static 
entity predisposed, if not predetermined, to recidivate based on the aggregate 
behavior of individuals sharing the same group identity, and do not recognize 
offenders as dynamic agents capable of reforming, and subsequently lowering 
their chance of recidivating. 
In light of these three principles, this Article argues that, of the seventeen 
major characteristics, only adult criminal history is an appropriate factor in actu-
arial risk-assessments, provided that adult criminal history is limited by temporal 
and qualitative considerations. 
Before proceeding, two qualifications on the scope of this Article must be 
noted. First, this Article assumes, and does not challenge, the superior accuracy 
of actuarial risk-assessments relative to clinical assessments of risk.26 The as-
                                                                                                                           
 24 These characteristics are race, sex, national origin, religion, socio-economic status, education 
and vocational skills, employment record, family rearing practices, family structure, community ties, 
family criminality, age, anti-social attitudes and personality, criminal companions, mental illness and 
substance abuse, pre-adult anti-social behavior, and adult criminal history. 
 25 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (2012). The SRA is part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 
Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 98 Stat. 1976. 
 26 Others have addressed this question, with conflicting results. Compare HARCOURT, supra note 
22, at 239 (quoting scholars who doubt that actuarial assessments produce better results than conven-
tional clinical predictions), and Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise, 133 U. PA. L. 
REV. 97, 11819 (1984) (“[P]redictions using the best actuarial techniques appear to be no better or 
worse than the best clinical predictions at identifying those individuals most likely to commit violent 
acts.”), with VERNON L. QUINSEY ET AL., VIOLENT OFFENDERS: APPRAISING AND MANAGING RISK 
218 (2006) (noting approvingly scholars who accept the use of actuarial instruments), and Grant T. 
Harris et al., Evidence for Risk Estimate Precision: Implications for Individual Risk Communication, 
33 BEHAV. SCI. L. 111, 111 (2015) (“The discriminative validity of several actuarial instruments is 
well established.”), and Prentky et al., supra note 15, at 372 (“Most scholars have concluded that the 
predictive efficacy of actuarial methods of risk assessment is superior to clinically derived assess-
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sessments themselves may be highly effective at identifying high-risk and low-
risk offenders. Even if the assessments are accurate, however, their usage 
should give us pause—for reasons beyond their efficacy or accuracy.27 
Second, while risk-assessment tools have been used primarily for “back-
end” or post-sentencing purposes, this Article is most interested in the potential 
for risk-assessments to influence “front-end” sentencing: specifically a judge’s 
decision to imprison an offender, and to elongate an offender’s prison term. 
The Attorney General recently asked the U.S. Sentencing Commission “to 
study the use of data-driven analysis in front-end sentencing—and to issue pol-
icy recommendations based on this careful, independent analysis.”28 These 
comments reveal the need for an examination of “big data” in front-end sen-
tencing decisions. They also underscore the fact that this inquiry is particularly 
ripe for national, state, and local consideration and implementation. 
This Article proceeds by way of the following structure: Part I reviews the 
four primary reasons why society may legitimately punish an individual, the 
relative prominence of these theories of punishment both historically and cur-
rently, and the emergence of hybrid theories of punishment. Part II offers a 
descriptive account of actuarial risk-assessment tools in the criminal justice 
system, explaining their content, increasing popularity, and purported benefits. 
Part III argues that actuarial predictions of recidivism must be limited for the 
three reasons enumerated above. Part IV applies this analysis to the seventeen 
principal characteristics discussed in the risk-assessment context, explaining 
why only adult criminal history, modified by temporal or qualitative considera-
tions, is valid from a penological standpoint. Part IV also responds to potential 
counter-arguments. Finally, Part V concludes. 
I. THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT 
This Part offers necessary background material for the consideration of 
whether and to what extent Moneyball decision-making should be imported 
into the sentencing context. First, Section A describes the philosophical rea-
sons why society should punish others. Second, Section B discusses the rela-
tive dominance of these reasons over time and in the present day. Finally, Sec-
tion C examines the development of mixed theories of punishment. 
                                                                                                                           
ments of risk . . . .” (citations omitted)). It is beyond the scope of this Article to resolve this disagree-
ment. 
 27 See United States v. C.R., 792 F. Supp. 2d 343, 462 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Evidence-based sen-
tencing . . . must be handled gingerly.”), vacated sub nom, United States v. Reingold, 731 F.3d 204 
(2d Cir.), remanded to 972 F. Supp. 2d 457 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).  
 28 Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney General, Address at the National Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers 57th Annual Meeting and 13th State Criminal Justice Network Conference (Aug. 1, 2014), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2014/ag-speech-140801.html, archived at 
https://perma.cc/88HM-J678 [hereinafter “Holder Remarks”]. 
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A. Reasons to Punish 
Laws establish the outer bounds of proper conduct. In order to give effect, 
laws must have punishments. As Alexander Hamilton recognized, “It is essen-
tial to the idea of a law, that it be attended with . . . a penalty or punishment for 
disobedience. If there be no penalty annexed to disobedience, the resolutions 
or commands which pretend to be laws will, in fact, amount to nothing more 
than advice or recommendation.”29 If laws require punishments, however, we 
must ask precisely why an individual should be punished. Specifically, the 
need to punish invites subsequent considerations of how the power to punish 
should be exercised and, more generally, what philosophical principles should 
guide those punishment decisions. 
The four primary theories of punishment fall within two categories: deon-
tological and utilitarian.30 One theory, retribution, stands alone in the deonto-
logical camp. Retribution asserts that punishment is an offender’s just deserts 
for what he or she has done in the past.31 Leading retributivist theorist Imman-
uel Kant wrote that punishment “must in all cases be imposed only because the 
individual on whom it is inflicted has committed a crime.”32 This is so regard-
less of any potential, subsequent value of the punishment to others.33 Retribu-
tion can neither be reduced to “an eye for an eye” system of justice, nor can it 
be deemed merely “vengeance in disguise.”34 Rather, under a retributivist 
                                                                                                                           
 29 THE FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 30 See Alfred Blumstein, The Search for the Elusive Common ‘Principle,’ 82 NW. U. L. REV. 43, 
44 (1988) (“The four traditional purposes—retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation—
serve only two distinct objectives. These objectives are retribution . . . and crime reduction.”); Aya 
Gruber, A Distributive Theory of Criminal Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 4 (2010) (“From the 
collective theorizing of thousands of the brightest minds, tomes of legal literature, and hundreds of 
years of debate, two predominant justifications of criminal punishment have emerged: retributivism 
and utilitarianism. Although there are multiple twists on these themes, the basic concept is that crimi-
nal liability is justified either because the offender deserves punishment or because punishment makes 
society safer . . . .”).  
 31 See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 9 (2d ed. 1968) (defining retribution as 
“the application of the pains of punishment to an offender who is morally guilty”); MICHAEL S. 
MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 91 (2010) (“We are justified 
in punishing because and only because offenders deserve it.”); HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF 
CRIMINAL SANCTION 35, 37 (1968) (“[B]ecause man is responsible for his actions, he ought to receive 
his just deserts.”); John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 4 (1955) (“[Retribution holds 
that] punishment is justified on the grounds that wrongdoing merits punishment.”). 
 32 IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 195 (W. Hastie transl., Edinburgh, T&T Clark 
1887) (1796). 
 33 See id. at 198 (“[T]he last murderer lying in the prison ought to be executed before the resolu-
tion was carried out.”); see also MOORE, supra note 31, at 88 (“The distinctive aspect of retributivism 
is that the moral desert of an offender is a sufficient reason to punish him . . . .”). 
 34 See Moore, supra note 31 at 88 (“[R]etributivism is sometimes identified with a particular 
measure of punishment such as lex talionis, an eye for an eye . . . .”); OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., 
THE COMMON LAW 45 (1909). Holmes characterized retribution in these terms, as did Herbert 
Wechsler. See Herbert Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1097, 
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framework, the offender is paying a “debt” owed to society for the improper 
“benefits and burdens” that he or she received from or imposed on others, 
which, when paid, restores an equilibrium within society. In this respect, a re-
tributivist model is primarily backward-looking: it focuses on the wrong previ-
ously committed. 
By contrast, the three instrumentalist theories of punishment—deterrence, 
incapacitation, and rehabilitation—are primarily forward-looking. They justify 
criminal sanction because of the social utility derived from punishing the of-
fender. These utilitarian justifications are predicated on realizing a social good; 
retribution, by contrast, sees punishment as intrinsically good. 
Of the utilitarian rationales for punishment, the deterrence theory holds 
that punishment should serve to discourage the offender (specific deterrence) 
and members of the public (general deterrence) from offending in the future.35 
Jeremy Bentham, the legal theorist most associated with deterrence, suggested 
that punishment is legitimate only to the extent that it reduces the “tendency 
towards the prevention of like acts.”36 In this sense, punishment is a cost that 
the offender and others will seek to avoid.37 Punishment therefore operates as a 
social message that criminal actions will be met by adverse consequences, 
such as those visited upon the instant offender. 
The theory of incapacitation is premised on the simple notion that pun-
ishment should physically separate the offender from others and thus limit his 
or her ability to engage in further harmful actions.38 Blackstone wrote that in-
capacitation “depriv[es] the party injuring of the power to do future mis-
chief.”39 It is a form of social protection by way of social segregation; an of-
fender is exiled for the welfare of others in general society.40 In short, incapaci-
                                                                                                                           
1103 (1952); see also HERBERT MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 
AND MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 34 (1976). 
 35 See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT 19 (1830). Bentham wrote, for ex-
ample, that punishment should serve two functions: “[p]articular prevention, which applies to the 
delinquent himself; and general prevention, which is applicable to all the members of the community 
without exception.” Id. 
 36 JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 322 (1802). 
 37 See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *11. Blackstone noted that punishment exists 
as “a precaution against future offences of the same kind,” and that this precaution “is effected . . . by 
the amendment of the offender himself” and “by deterring others by the dread of his example from 
offending in the like way . . . .” Id. 
 38 See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2490 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“If imprisonment 
does nothing else, it removes the criminal from the general population and prevents him from commit-
ting additional crimes in the outside world.”); Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim’s Rights, 
37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 989 (1985) (“Proponents of the incapacitation approach believe that the best 
way to prevent a particular offender from committing future crimes is to remove him from society.”). 
 39 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 37, at *11–12. 
 40 See Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an Articulated 
Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1316 (2000) (“Incapacitation uses 
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tation is said to be justifiable because it serves as a blunt form of threat-
removal. 
Finally, the rehabilitative theory of punishment posits that a sentence 
should afford the offender an opportunity for personal reform and develop-
ment.41 Any gains from this positive transformation will be realized not only 
by the individual, but by society, as the offender will pose less danger to socie-
ty after release. Such self-improvement may take place as a result of atonement 
or penance, which may be the product of the offender’s moral code or religious 
tradition, or guilt or similar appreciation for one’s actions, which may be secu-
lar or emotional in nature.42 It also may take place by way of treatment,43 in-
cluding the completion of programs that address the offender’s personal well-
being, mental health, substance abuse addiction, education, and/or capacity to 
respond to triggers to anti-social action.44 In short, rehabilitation demands a 
social investment in the offender, which will pay dividends in the offender and 
in his or her community. 
With an understanding of the four major theoretical reasons why the state 
may punish an individual, we may consider the extent to which the criminal 
justice system has invoked these reasons over time and today. 
B. The Relative Salience of the Reasons to Punish 
The American criminal justice system has not settled on any one theory as 
the single or main principled foundation for punishment.45 Rather, at various 
                                                                                                                           
imprisonment to remove the offender from society to protect it from the danger he poses. This concept 
is also conveyed by the use of the terms ‘isolation,’ ‘segregation,’ ‘restraint,’ and ‘confinement.’”). 
 41 See United States v. Cole, 622 F. Supp. 2d 632, 638 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (“Rehabilitation, gener-
ally, endeavors to turn one person’s path.”). 
 42 Cotton, supra note 40, at 1317 (describing rehabilitation as including “an opportunity for peni-
tent reflection”). For a discussion of “secular atonement” that incarceration affords, see Stephen P. 
Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1801, 1810–27 (1999). 
 43 Of course, the personal transformation signified by atonement or penance, for example, should 
not be seen as inconsistent with, or an absolute alternative to, rehabilitation by way of treatment. Both 
may be used simultaneously, and as mutually reinforcing and reciprocal supplemental approaches. In 
other words, there is no “either-or” situation within the ambit of rehabilitation. 
 44 Cotton, supra note 40, at 1316–17 (defining rehabilitation as “an opportunity to provide train-
ing for skills useful in the marketplace, treatment for psychological problems and drug addiction”); 
Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 70 (2005) (remarking that rehabilitation 
“assumes that the offender has identifiable and treatable problems which cause him to commit crimes” 
and therefore “seeks to reduce the offender’s future criminality by addressing those causes through 
education and treatment in prison or in a nonprison program”). 
 45 See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 455 
(1997) (“The debate between the desert justification and the various utilitarian justifications such as 
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation has continued to divide criminal law thinkers to this 
day.”). 
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points in American history, one or multiple theories have served as the primary 
justification for punishment.46 
In early America, punishment was directed largely at deterring crime.47 
Banishing offenders, a form of exile akin to incapacitation, also animated pun-
ishment.48 Retribution became a factor only in the context of the most serious 
offenses, such as murder.49 Rehabilitation did not seem to inform punishment, 
as sentencers were said to be concerned not with “reform[ing] the offender but 
[with] fright[ening] him into lawful behavior.”50 
In the nineteenth century, however, rehabilitation emerged as a major sen-
tencing model.51 As one criminal law scholar writes, the country “move[d] . . . 
toward the development of penitentiaries focused on the spiritual rehabilitation 
of lawbreakers.”52 This emphasis on rehabilitation continued in the twentieth 
century.53 Further “advances in medicine and psychology . . . reinforce[d] [the] 
view of criminal offenders as ‘sick’” as well as the goal of “sentencing 
schemes . . . to help ‘cure’ the patient.”54 
The attraction of the rehabilitative model faded in the twentieth century. 
Since rehabilitative punishment seeks to improve the offender such that he or 
she is better able to stay within the bounds of the law, judges necessarily had to 
tailor sentences to maximize the opportunity for that internal development.55 
This individualized sentencing led to inevitable disparities in sentencing. The 
notion that each individual is different and has unique needs created tension 
                                                                                                                           
 46 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 819 (1991) (“The principles which have guided criminal 
sentencing . . . have varied with the times.”). 
 47 See David J. Rothman, Perfecting the Prison: United States, 1789–1865, in THE OXFORD HIS-
TORY OF THE PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN SOCIETY 111, 112 (Norval Morris 
& David J. Rothman eds., 1995) (“The primary goal in dispending . . . penalties was deterrence, in the 
hope that the punishment would serve to keep the offender from repeating the crime in this particular 
community.”). 
 48 See id. at 113 (“[B]anishment represented the town’s efforts to avoid the repetition of a crime 
by getting rid of the offender . . . .”). 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. at 116 (“Reform, not deterrence, was now the aim of incarceration. The shared assumption 
was that since the convict was not innately depraved but had failed to be trained to obedience by fami-
ly, church, school, or community, he could be redeemed by the well-ordered routine of prison.”). 
 52 Douglas A. Berman, The Enduring (and Again Timely) Wisdom of the Original MPC Sentenc-
ing Provisions, 61 FLA. L. REV. 709, 715 (2009). 
 53 See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949) (“Reformation and rehabilitation of of-
fenders have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence.”). 
 54 Berman, supra note 52, at 715. 
 55 Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Recognizing Constitutional Rights at Sentencing, 
99 CALIF. L. REV. 47, 52 (2011) (“These discretionary systems originally were premised on the pun-
ishment rationale of rehabilitation. Discretionary schemes allowed judges to tailor sentences to the 
specific characteristics of the individual defendant with an eye towards reforming the defendant’s 
lawbreaking ways.”). 
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with the proposition that similar defendants receive similar sentences.56 A 
combination of disparities in sentencing and uncertainty in the term of impris-
onment provoked significant changes in the modern criminal justice system. 
In 1984, Congress responded to these twin concerns by enacting the Sen-
tencing Reform Act (“SRA”).57 In particular, the SRA established the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines, an advisable range of sentencing outcomes based on two in-
puts: the offense conduct (i.e., what the offender has done this time) and the 
offender’s criminal history (i.e., what the offender has done in the past).58 
These ranges act as a “national norm” that judges must consult upon the impo-
sition of a sentence.59 In particular, a federal judge must use the Guidelines as 
the “starting point and initial benchmark” for his or her analysis of an appro-
priate sentence.60 The SRA also established the U.S. Sentencing Commission, 
                                                                                                                           
 56 Parole officers engaged in similar discretionary decision-making in determining whether and 
when inmates were sufficiently rehabilitated and prepared for release into general society. See Doug-
las A. Berman, From Lawlessness to Too Much Law? Exploring the Risk of Disparity from Differ-
ences in Defense Counsel Under Guidelines Sentencing, 87 IOWA L. REV. 435, 440 (2002) (“[B]road 
judicial discretion in the ascription of sentencing terms—complemented by parole officials exercising 
similar discretion concerning prison release dates—was viewed as necessary to ensure that sentences 
could be tailored to the rehabilitative prospects and progress of each offender.”). 
 57 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363–66 (1989); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A (2013) [hereinafter GUIDELINES MANUAL] (explaining that, through the SRA, 
“Congress first sought honesty in sentencing” by avoiding “indeterminate sentence[s] of imprison-
ment,” and “[s]econd, Congress sought reasonable uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the wide 
disparity in sentences imposed for similar criminal offenses committed by similar offenders”).  
 58 Peugh v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2072, 2079 (2013) (noting that the Guidelines are “a system 
under which a set of inputs specific to a given case (the particular characteristics of the offense and 
offender) yielded a predetermined output (a range of months within which the defendant could be 
sentenced)”). The Guidelines’ Sentencing Table features the offense conduct and the offender’s crim-
inal history background as the two axes that operate as the primary factors as to the defendant’s ap-
propriate sentence. See GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 57, ch. 5, pt. A (sentencing table). The 
ranges themselves were the average sentences imposed at the time of the SRA’s enactment. Justice 
Stephen Breyer, a member of the inaugural Sentencing Commission, explained that the Commission 
“decided to base the Guidelines primarily upon typical, or average, actual past practice.” Stephen 
Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 17 (1988). 
 59 According to multiple courts, the Guidelines are useful in that they establish a “national norm” 
as to the appropriate sentence for like offenses by like offenders. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-
Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 738 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Smith, 445 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2006); 
Federal Sentencing Options After Booker: Hearing Before the U.S. Sentencing Commission, 112th 
Cong. 6–10 (2012) (statement of Paul J. Barbadoro, U.S. Dist. J.), available at http://www.ussc.
gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/public-hearings-and-meetings/20120215-16/Testimony_
16_Barbadoro.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/GS23-2398 (“Judges . . . appreciate knowing whether 
their sentences are in step with other sentences by other judges for similar cases.”). In 2005, the Su-
preme Court declared these ranges advisory, rather than mandatory. See United States v. Booker, 543 
U.S. 220, 226–27 (2005). 
 60 Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 39 (2007). To the extent that a sentence imposed by a feder-
al judge deviates from the Guidelines system, a judge must explain in greater detail why the non-
Guidelines sentence is appropriate. See id. at 50. 
682 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:671 
an independent agency within the federal courts whose role is to create, revisit, 
and revise the Guidelines.61 
The SRA codified the four basic purposes of criminal punishment. The 
statute expressly provides that a court imposing a sentence must consider the 
need “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, 
and to provide just punishment for the offense” (which corresponds with the 
retributive justification of punishment); “to afford adequate deterrence to crim-
inal conduct” (deterrence); “to protect the public from further crimes of the 
defendant” (incapacitation); and “to provide the defendant with needed educa-
tional or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in 
the most effective manner” (rehabilitation).62 The SRA does not select a pre-
ferred justification to guide sentencing decisions, nor does it create any specif-
ic hierarchy among the purposes.63 Instead, all are listed in a co-equal man-
ner.64 The SRA gives judges the general—and rather difficult— instruction to 
impose a sentence that is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to effectu-
ate these four purposes.65 
C. Hybrid Theories of Punishment 
Judges may find it quite challenging, if not impossible, to fulfill the SRA’s 
mandate to impose a punishment that reflects the four purposes. Indeed, many 
scholars view the retributivist and utilitarian purposes of punishment as incon-
                                                                                                                           
 61 See GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 57, ch. 1, pt. A, subpt. 2 (“[The SRA] empowered the 
Commission with ongoing responsibilities to monitor the guidelines [and] submit to Congress appro-
priate modifications of the guidelines and recommended changes in criminal statutes,” and this “man-
date rested on congressional awareness that sentencing is a dynamic field that requires continuing 
review by an expert body to revise sentencing policies . . . .”). For a summary of the Commission’s 
responsibilities, see Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 369–70. 
 62 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2012). 
 63 See Douglas A. Berman, Reconceptualizing Sentencing, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 11–13 
(“Though in the Sentencing Reform Act Congress expressed a fundamental concern with principled 
sentencing, the SRA did not adopt a particular punishment philosophy; rather, its statutory statement 
of purposes listed all of the traditional justifications of punishment. . . . [T]hrough two decades of 
federal sentencing reform neither Congress nor the United States Sentencing Commission has ex-
pressly defined or fully articulated the central or primary purposes for federal sentencing.”). To be 
sure, “the Constitution does not mandate adoption of any one penological theory,” and “a sentence can 
have a variety of justifications.” Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003) (internal quotes and 
citation omitted). 
 64 Judges and others have debated which theory has dominated and should dominate sentencing. 
See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 835 F.2d 1195, 1199 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J., concurring) (opin-
ing that “deterrence is the surest ground for punishment, since retributive norms are so unsettled”); 
Aaron H. Caplan, Freedom of Speech in School and Prison, 85 WASH. L. REV. 71, 100–01 (2010) 
(suggesting that rehabilitation has played a secondary role among penological interests). 
 65 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 
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sistent.66 As John Rawls wrote, ”one feels the force of both arguments and one 
wonders how they can be reconciled.”67 
This tension is especially pronounced in the strict form of retributivism, 
which is expressed today in two main strands. The “affirmative” strand of re-
tributivism contends that an offender who breaks the law must be punished, 
irrespective of the public safety gains of punishment.68 The second strand of 
retribution, the soft or “negative” view, holds that punishment, if inflicted, 
must be because of the offender’s desert.69 Utilitarians do not have an automat-
ic, “affirmative” analogue. The single utilitarian position is conditional: an of-
fender should be punished only if there are public safety benefits to punish-
ment.70 This Article, which presumes the offender is guilty and will be pun-
ished no matter the theory of punishment, need not resolve this disharmony. 
Turning to Rawls’ question of whether retribution and utilitarianism can 
be reconciled, legal philosophers have taken on the onerous task of fusing the 
two purposes into a single suitable instrument of punishment. In particular, 
they have posited that retributive values may serve as “side restraints” on the 
achievement of utilitarian objectives. The term “side constraint,” attributed to 
philosopher Robert Nozick, refers to restrictions on the process of achieving 
some end or objective. Nozick writes, for example, that individual rights may 
not be an end that competes with other social ends, but rather a limitation on 
the means used to further social ends, whatever they may be.71 
To provide another example, Bentham, perhaps the foremost advocate of 
utilitarianism, proposed that punishment be justified for utilitarian reasons. Yet 
any resulting punishment, Bentham argued, should be proportionate to the se-
riousness of the offense—despite the fact that seriousness is a retributivist con-
sideration.72 In this respect, retributive notions of seriousness are a side con-
straint on utilitarian goals. To offer yet another example, renowned legal phi-
losopher H.L.A. Hart recognized that “any morally tolerable account of this 
                                                                                                                           
 66 See PACKER, supra note 31, at 36 (positing that the two overarching purposes of punishment—
retribution, “the deserved infliction of suffering on evil doers,” and utilitarianism, “the prevention of 
crime”—are “almost universally thought of as being incompatible”). 
 67 Rawls, supra note 31, at 5. His solution was that “utilitarian arguments are appropriate with 
regard to questions about practices, while retributive arguments fit the application of particular rules 
to particular cases.” Id. 
 68 See Kenneth W. Simons, Retributivism Refined—Or Run Amok?, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 551, 557 
(2010) (reviewing LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, WITH STEPHEN MORSE, 
CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW (2009)). 
 69 See id. 
 70 See Guyora Binder & Nicholas J. Smith, Framed: Utilitarianism and Punishment of the Inno-
cent, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 115, 116 (2000) (“Utilitarian penology treats punishment as . . . permissible 
only when its benefits in reducing future crime outweigh the pain, fear, and public expense it impos-
es.”) (emphasis added). 
 71 ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 29 (1974) (suggesting that rights may be 
“side constraints upon the actions to be done,” irrespective of the goals of the actions). 
 72 Id. at 12. 
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institution [of criminal punishment] must exhibit it as a compromise between 
distinct and partly conflicting principles.”73 He suggested that blameworthi-
ness, fairness, and proportionality should restrain punishments otherwise justi-
fied on utilitarian grounds.74 These arguments that utilitarian imperatives be 
qualified by retributivist principles represent a merger between, or hybrid form 
of, retributive and utilitarian theories. 
These attempts at reconciliation, particularly Hart’s formulation, are re-
garded as “extremely influential” and are heralded for their “dominance.”75 
Indeed, hybrid or mixed theories of punishment have been implemented in a 
number of states. One criminal law professor observes that “most jurisdictions 
have adopted a model that uses retribution as a limitation on utilitarian 
goals.”76 
The benefits of the hybrid approach are readily understandable. The side 
constraint approach avoids the “either-or” problem of choosing between the 
two theoretical camps. As the criminal law theorist Herbert Packer noted, “it 
would be socially damaging in the extreme to discard either” the retributivist 
or consequentialist theory.”77 Indeed, a mixed theory affords the criminal jus-
tice system the ability to take advantage of the virtues of both theories as the 
cases demand. This is valuable because no single purpose for punishment is 
satisfactory in all sentencing occasions.78 It also comports with the reality of 
sentencing. Packer observes that “the institution of criminal punishment draws 
substance from both of these ultimate purposes . . . .”79 
Finally, in the federal system, where the SRA mandates that judges impose 
sentences that reflect retributivist and utilitarian purposes,80 the hybrid approach 
may be somewhat of a necessity. The hybrid system facilitates this task. Accord-
ingly, the four purposes of punishment “can all be pursued under a regime with 
                                                                                                                           
 73 See HART, supra note 31, at 1. 
 74 Id. at 11–13. 
 75 Ian P. Farrell, Gilbert & Sullivan and Scalia: Philosophy, Proportionality, and the Eighth 
Amendment, 55 VILL. L. REV. 321, 359 (2010). 
 76 Leo M. Romero, Punitive Damages, Criminal Punishment, and Proportionality: The Im-
portance of Legislative Limits, 41 CONN. L. REV. 109, 123 (2008). 
 77 PACKER, supra note 31, at 37. 
 78 See Paul H. Robinson, Hybrid Principals for the Distribution of Criminal Sanctions, 82 NW. U. 
L. REV. 19, 36 (1987). Alfred Blumstein offers four hypotheticals that, together, help highlight the 
value of an integrated sentencing model: an income tax violator would receive a sentence animated 
most by deterrence, a man who kills his wife in the heat of passion would receive a sentence justified 
most by just deserts, and a robber with a substance abuse problem would be deemed less blameworthy 
than a conspirator who is clean even though the diseased confederate is more likely to recidivate. 
Blumstein, supra note 30, at 47. 
 79 PACKER, supra note 31, at 37; cf. Monahan, supra note 23, at 427 (“[M]odern sentencing is 
either purely retributive, or it is a mix of retributive and crime-control considerations.”). 
 80 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012). 
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retributivism as a side constraint, as long as such pursuits do not violate the side 
constraint.”81 
II. EVIDENCE-BASED SENTENCING 
This Part summarizes actuarial risk-assessment instruments. First, Section 
A offers an overview of the emergence of risk-assessment tools in criminal 
sentencing. Second, Section B gives examples of how risk-assessment tools 
are utilized in practice. Finally, Section C summarizes the purported benefits of 
risk-assessment tools in criminal sentencing. 
A. What—Predicting Risk of Recidivism 
Recidivism, an offender’s relapse into criminal behavior, is a fundamental 
issue in sentencing. The prospect of recidivism leads courts to seek sentences 
that mitigate the likelihood that an individual may re-offend. It also moves 
courts to ensure that, if an individual does re-offend, subsequent sentences can 
respond commensurately to the individual’s demonstrated inability or unwill-
ingness to conform to the law. 
From its earliest moments, the American criminal justice system has been 
concerned by recidivism. In colonial America, laws dealing with recidivism 
trace back to at least 1695.82 As an example of one such law, Virginia in 1705 
addressed “the persistent problem of hog stealing by passing a statute that pro-
vided progressively more severe penalties for each subsequent offense.”83 
In order to tailor initial sentences to reduce or eliminate recidivism, sen-
tencers must gauge the potential for the offender to recidivate. They must, in 
essence, forecast a person’s penchant for future criminality. 
The American criminal justice system entered this prediction business 
almost a century ago. The first recorded effort to predict recidivism was devel-
oped in 1928 for an Illinois parole board.84 Two years later, criminologists 
published a study of 510 offenders released from 1911 through 1922, in which 
they specifically analyzed these offenders’ recidivism rates, identifying several 
recurring causes.85 
                                                                                                                           
 81 Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677, 
743 (2005). 
 82 See Note, Selective Incapacitation: Reducing Crime Through Prediction of Recidivism, 96 
HARV. L. REV. 511, 511 (1982). 
 83 Id. (citing LAWS OF VIRGINIA 276–78 (W. Hening ed., 1823)). 
 84 See Coffee, supra note 23, at 1011. 
 85 See generally SHELDON GLUECK & ELEANOR T. GLUECK, 500 CRIMINAL CAREERS (1930) 
(providing in-depth analysis of 500 criminals’ careers). For follow-up and related studies by these 
impressive authors, see generally SHELDON GLUECK & ELEANOR T. GLUECK, LATER CRIMINAL CA-
REERS (1937); SHELDON GLUECK & ELEANOR T. GLUECK, CRIMINAL CAREERS IN RETROSPECT 
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Though the practice of predicting future criminality stretches back many 
years, the prediction enterprise did not began in earnest until the last three dec-
ades. The courtroom context of setting bail helps illustrate this. Historically, 
judges would grant bail, except for those who presented a flight risk and those 
who were alleged to have committed capital crimes and thus were deemed 
imminent threats to public safety on the basis of the capital offense.86 In the 
contemporary criminal justice system, however, federal law and corresponding 
state statutes have vastly expanded the scope of those who may be detained 
pretrial.87 Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984, for instance, judges were au-
thorized to deny bail to those who were categorically treated as threats to pub-
lic safety on account of their charge, and also to those that the judges deter-
mined would “endanger the safety of any other person or the community.”88 
This non-categorical approach demanded that judges engage in predictions of 
which offenders would likely not re-offend, and therefore could be released 
pretrial, and those who presented a substantial threat of endangering others and 
thus could be detained pretrial. 
Today, predictions of recidivism are ubiquitous in criminal sentencing. 
According to Justice John Paul Stevens, “prediction of future criminal conduct 
is an essential element in many of the decisions rendered throughout our crim-
inal justice system,” and a “task performed countless times each day through-
out the American system of criminal justice.”89 Elsewhere, the Court observed, 
“prediction of future criminal conduct . . . forms an important element in many 
decisions . . . .”90 One judge noted that “[p]rediction is inherent in sentencing 
decisions,”91 while a law professor who writes frequently on this subject, put it 
more bluntly: “everybody’s doing it.”92 
Beyond bail, predictions of future dangerousness inform numerous sentenc-
ing decisions. These include “whether multiple sentences should run consecu-
tively or concurrently,” “the appropriate conditions of probation,” and “the na-
ture of any sanction to be imposed upon violation of probation.”93 This Article 
                                                                                                                           
(1943); SHELDON GLUECK & ELEANOR T. GLUECK JUVENILE DELINQUENTS GROWN UP (1940); 
SHELDON GLUECK & ELEANOR T. GLUECK UNRAVELING JUVENILE DELINQUENCY (1950). 
 86 See Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 497, 503 
(2012). 
 87 See id. at 499. 
 88 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b) (2012). 
 89 Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 275 (1976) (opinion of Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens). 
 90 Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 278 (1984). 
 91 See Michael A. Wolff, Evidence-Based Judicial Discretion: Promoting Public Safety Through 
State Sentencing Reform, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1389, 1406 (2008). 
 92 Michael Tonry, Legal and Ethical Issues in the Prediction of Recidivism, 26 FED. SENT’G REP. 
167, 168 (2014). 
 93 Roger K. Warren, Evidence-Based Practices and State Sentencing Policy: Ten Policy Initia-
tives to Reduce Recidivism, 82 IND. L.J. 1307, 1311 (2007). 
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focuses mainly on whether and for how long an offender should be impris-
oned.94 
In short, forecasting the risk of recidivism is an important function in the 
criminal justice system; these predictions are widespread and common within 
the system; and the predictions influence an extensive range of sentencing de-
cisions. 
B. How—From Clinical Judgments to Actuarial Instruments 
For the most part, predicting an offender’s risk of recidivating has been 
done by way of clinical assessments. Akin to the observational, intuitive judg-
ments relied on by baseball teams to estimate a player’s future performance, 
clinical predictions of risk are characterized as “an informal, ‘in the head,’ 
[and] impressionistic, subjective conclusion” about the offender’s future dan-
gerousness.95 In the clinical model, assessments are generally made in two 
ways. One, mental health professionals such as a psychologist or psychiatrist 
may evaluate an individual and then communicate their assessment to the 
court.96 Or, two, an actor in the criminal justice system like a judge or a parole 
board makes a direct assessment of the individual’s dangerousness. Generally, 
a clinical assessment is based on a comprehensive interview of the individual, 
interviews of those in the individual’s family and social circles, and a review 
of files on the individual’s mental history insofar as these materials may relate 
to the individual’s future dangerousness.97 
To provide an example of the contents of the interviews, in one clinical 
survey an individual’s propensity for violence is ascertained by reference to 
twelve questions. These questions include whether the individual lived with 
both of his or her parents to the age of sixteen, whether the individual experi-
enced any behavioral problems in elementary school, whether the individual 
has a history of alcohol abuse, and whether the individual is married.98 The 
twelve inputs also include an assessment of whether the individual meets the 
                                                                                                                           
 94 The in-out decision and length of incarceration decision are themselves composites of several 
subsidiary questions, including “whether an offender is suitable for a non-incarceration sanction,” 
what may be “the most appropriate form of intermediate or non-incarceration sanction,” whether the 
offender is eligible for a diversion program, and whether the offender is amenable to treatment. Id. 
 95 William M. Grove & Paul E. Meehl, Comparative Efficiency of Informal (Subjective, Impres-
sionistic) and Formal (Mechanical, Algorithmic) Prediction Procedures: The Clinical Statistical Con-
troversy, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 293, 294 (1996). 
 96 The acceptance in court of such professional opinion is reflected by the following Supreme 
Court comment: “The suggestion that no psychiatrist’s testimony may be presented with respect to a 
defendant’s future dangerousness is somewhat like asking us to disinvent the wheel.” Barefoot v. 
Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 896 (1983). 
 97 See Slobogin, supra note 26, at 119. 
 98 VERNON L. QUINSEY ET AL., VIOLENT OFFENDERS: APPRAISING AND MANAGING RISK 162 
(2d ed. 2006) (displaying a chart noting the twelve variables and their corresponding correlation with 
recidivism). 
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clinical standard for having either a personality disorder or schizophrenia, or 
being a psychopath.99 
Increasingly, the criminal justice system has been transitioning from these 
types of clinical predictions to actuarial predictions of risk. It has been noted 
that, “the field of ‘violence risk assessment’ has seen a dramatic shift away 
from studies attempting to validate the accuracy of clinical predictions, and 
toward studies attempting to isolate specific risk factors that are actuarially 
(meaning statistically) associated with violence.”100 Others have recognized 
this “transformation” in penal ideology and the “emergence of . . . language of 
probability and risk increasingly replaces earlier discourses of clinical diagno-
sis and retributive judgment.”101 
This begs the question: what is an actuarial risk-assessment? The actuarial 
model “relies solely on variables known to correlate statistically with violent 
behavior” and in particular “produces a numerical probability that an individu-
al with given characteristics will act violently within a fixed time period.”102 
Psychologists provide a helpful definition of actuarial risk-assessments: “em-
pirically derived mechanical rules for combining information to produce a 
quantitative estimate of risk.”103 The contents of the tools themselves can vary 
widely—they may analyze as few as ten factors or as many as one hundred.104 
Beyond the meaning of actuarial risk-assessments, examples of these pre-
dictive instruments may be helpful. While others have focused on state risk-
assessments, these two examples are drawn from the federal sentencing system. 
The aforementioned Bail Reform Act of 1984 requires a judge, in consideration 
of whether an individual should be detained pretrial, to be assured that the indi-
vidual would not pose a threat to the “safety of any other person and the com-
munity . . . .”105 The statute compels judges to weigh, in making this determina-
tion, the charged offense, the evidence against the individual, and, most im-
portant here, the “history and characteristics of the person . . . .”106 These “histo-
ry and characteristics” include, according to the statute, “the person’s character, 
physical and mental condition, family ties, employment, financial resources, 
                                                                                                                           
 99 Id. 
 100 John Monahan, Violence Risk Assessment: Scientific Validity and Evidentiary Admissibility, 
57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 901, 905–06 (2000) (internal footnote omitted). 
 101 Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy 
of Corrections and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 450 (1992). 
 102 Slobogin, supra note 26, at 110. 
 103 See Prentky et al., supra note 15, at 370; see also PAUL MEEHL, CLINICAL VERSUS STATISTI-
CAL PREDICTION 3 (1954) (“The mechanical combining of information for classification purposes, 
and the resultant probability figure which is an empirically determined relative frequency, are the 
characteristics that define the actuarial or statistical type of prediction.”). 
 104 See Joseph Walker, States Turn to Software to Make Parole Decisions, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 
2013, at A1. 
 105 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (2012). 
 106 Id. § 3142(g)(1)–(3). 
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length of residence in the community, community ties, past conduct, history re-
lating to drug or alcohol abuse, [and] criminal history,”107 as well as “whether, at 
the time of the current offense or arrest, the person was on probation, on parole, 
or on other release pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or completion of sentence 
for an offense under Federal, State, or local law . . . .”108 
In response to the fact that pretrial detention had become the rule and not 
the exception, and given the economic, logistical, and constitutional costs of 
such significant pretrial detention, federal pretrial service officers developed an 
actuarial tool, known as the Pretrial Risk Assessment (“PTRA”).109 The PTRA 
consists of several scored inputs, which are divided into two domains: “crimi-
nal history” and “other.”110 The criminal history questions include whether the 
individual has any felony convictions and if so how many, whether the indi-
vidual has any pending felonies or misdemeanors, the type and class of the 
current offense, and the individual’s age.111 The “other” inputs include the 
highest level of education achieved by the individual, the individual’s em-
ployment status and history, where the individual lives and whether he or she 
owns this place of residence, and the individual’s substance or alcohol abuse, if 
any.112 The individual is then assigned to one of five risk levels.113 Pretrial ser-
vices officers will report his or her assessment, and make a corresponding de-
tention or release recommendation to a judge.114 
Whereas PTRA addresses pretrial detention, the Post-Conviction Risk As-
sessment (“PCRA”) concerns the other end of the sentencing process: post-
release supervision. In the 1970s, the federal judiciary “required probation of-
ficers to classify persons under supervision into maximum, medium, and min-
imum supervision categories dependent upon the nature and seriousness of the 
original offense, extent of prior criminal history, and social and personal back-
ground factors in the individual case.”115 Federal probation officers therefore 
                                                                                                                           
 107 Id. § 3142(g)(3)(A). This Article excluded from this list one characteristic (i.e., the person’s 
“record concerning appearance at court proceedings[,]”) as it does not seem germane to the question 
of future dangerousness. See id. 
 108 Id. § 3142(g)(3)(B). 
 109 See Christopher T. Lowenkamp & Jay Whetzel, The Development of an Actuarial Risk As-
sessment Instrument for U.S. Pretrial Services, 73 FED. PROBATION 33, 33–35 (2009). 
 110 OFFICE OF PROBATION & PRETRIAL SERV., FEDERAL PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT USER’S 
MANUAL AND SCORING GUIDE 2 (2010). The nine unscored inputs, which do not “contribute to the 
overall risk score,” are not included. Id. 
 111 Id. at 5, 7–10. Questions relating to failure to appear are excluded. See id. at 6. 
 112 Id. at 12–14, 16–17. Questions relating to failure to appear are excluded. See id. at 19–27. 
 113 Id. at 3. 
 114 See Timothy P. Cadigan & Christopher T. Lowenkamp, Implementing Risk Assessment in the 
Federal Pretrial Services System, 75 FED. PROBATION 30, 30–33 (2011). 
 115 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, AN OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL POST CONVICTION 
RISK ASSESSMENT 4 (2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/FederalCourts/PPS/
PCRA_Sep_2011.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/LX6A-YB3S (citation and internal quotes omitted) 
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developed and used actuarial tools designed to help them determine “how 
much time and effort to devote to working with certain groups of persons.”116 
The PCRA remains the probation office’s current predictive instrument and 
consists of fifteen scored inputs.117 These include the offender’s age, the total 
number of the offender’s adult convictions, prior arrests for violent crimes, do-
mestic violence, and other prior arrests, the offender’s history of sex offending 
offenses, the different types of offenses that the offender has engaged in, how 
many times the offender was “written up” and “officially punished” while incar-
cerated, whether the offender committed a new crime while under previous peri-
ods of supervision, the highest level of education that the offender has complet-
ed, whether the offender was employed at the time the pre-sentence investigation 
report was prepared and at the time of arrest, and whether the offender has a cur-
rent alcohol or drug problem.118 An offender’s actuarial risk profile can then de-
termine the level of supervision the probation office will dedicate to the offender. 
In addition to these federal actuarial tools, twenty states have adopted, or 
are adopting, actuarial risk assessment instruments: Arizona, Arkansas, Dela-
ware, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri, North Carolina, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, 
Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia.119 In addition, external legal organi-
zations have also endorsed risk-assessments. The American Law Institute, per-
haps most prominent of these groups, has proposed revisions to the Model Pe-
nal Code that would require state sentencing systems to implement actuarial 
risk assessments.120 The National Center for State Courts has actively advocat-
ed for the use of these tools as well.121 
In sum, the criminal justice system is moving away from a clinical or im-
pressionistic method of assessing the risk of recidivism to an actuarial model. 
The embrace of this data-driven approach has reached the federal level and is 
spreading across the states. 
C. Why—Benefits of Risk-Assessment Tools 
What accounts for this trend? Risk-assessment tools are popular because 
they are said to offer several distinct and attractive benefits. First, the tools are 
premised upon statistical analysis. This is noteworthy because of legislators’ and 
                                                                                                                           
 116 Id. (citation and internal quotes omitted). 
 117 See James L. Johnson et al., The Construction and Validation of the Federal Post Conviction 
Risk Assessment (PCRA), 75 FED. PROBATION 16, 29 (2011). 
 118 See id. 
 119 JUSTICE REINVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 18, at 39; Starr, supra note 18, at 809. 
 120 See MPC DRAFT, supra note 20, § 6B.09. 
 121 See OSTROM ET AL., supra note 19, at 1–2. The Pew Center on the States is another respected 
organization that has signed on to these tools. See PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, TIME SERVED: THE 
HIGH COST, LOW RETURN OF LONGER PRISON TERMS 42–43 (2012). 
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judges’ preferences to rely on empirical approaches. The Sentencing Guidelines, 
for example, use the average sentences imposed during the pre-Guidelines era as 
their starting point for calculating uniform guidelines.122 The Sentencing Com-
mission consciously selected this data-driven approach as an alternative to the 
difficult task of choosing between or integrating competing sentencing philoso-
phies.123 Risk assessment instruments thus seek to follow this preference for em-
pirical information. 
Second, in contrast to clinical evaluations of risk, which are a function of 
the “subjective impression” of the mental health professional,124 actuarial risk 
assessments are the product of mathematical scores and thus “yield an objective 
estimate of violence risk.”125 Third, and relatedly, whereas clinical opinions 
may vary widely depending on the professional conducting the evaluation, ac-
tuarial risk assessments produce consistent and reliable numbers no matter 
who does the calculation.126 Fourth, and relatedly, allowing judges to receive 
and act on numbers that are identical for all judges will promote judicial uni-
formity and limit judicial discretion.127 
Fifth, and importantly, compared to clinical assessments, actuarial risk as-
sessments are purported to be more effective in forecasting who will recidi-
vate128 and in sorting offenders into more detailed risk categories.129 For ex-
ample, a mental health expert may be able to state that an offender is “danger-
ous” or “non-dangerous”;130 a risk assessment instrument, however, may as-
sign offenders to different gradients of risk, such as “high,” “moderate,” “low-
moderate,” and “low.”131 
                                                                                                                           
 122 See GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 57, ch.1, pt. A, subpt. 1(3). 
 123 See id. 
 124 Slobogin, supra note 26, at 122. 
 125 Monahan, supra note 23, at 406. 
 126 See Slobogin, supra note 26, at 122–23. But see Coffee, supra note 23, at 1002 (“[The] neu-
trality [offered by actuarial tools] becomes untenable when the poor, high-risk offender receives a 
longer sentence for such a crime than the rich, low-risk offender.”). 
 127 See Wolff, supra note 91, at 1416 (“‘Evidence-based sentencing’ should replace the misunder-
stood phrase ‘judicial discretion.’ As with many decisions in our courts and in our criminal justice 
system, discretion is inherent. Instead of removing discretion, we should be prepared to defend our 
decisions by basing them on evidence . . . .”). 
 128 See Monahan, supra note 23, at 408 (“The general superiority of actuarial over clinical risk 
assessment in the behavioral sciences has been known for half a century.”). Experts have expressed 
disagreement as to whether actuarial risk assessments are indeed better. 
 129 See Kelly Hannah-Moffat, Criminogenic Needs and the Transformative Risk Subject: Hybridi-
zations of Risk/Need in Penality, 7 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 1, 29–51 (2004) (“[R]isk instruments 
demonstrate an increasingly refined capacity to sort and classify criminalized populations.”), quoted in 
Jordan M. Hyatt et al., Reform in Motion: The Promise and Perils of Incorporating Risk Assessments 
and Cost-Benefit Analysis into Pennsylvania Sentencing, 49 DUQ. L. REV. 707, 729 (2011). 
 130 See Slobogin, supra note 26, at 123. 
 131 See Johnson et al., supra note 117, at 20. 
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The claimed efficiencies of risk assessment tools are possible because the 
tools are the product of multiple characteristics that correlate with higher recid-
ivism.132 The Supreme Court has recognized that “a prediction of future crimi-
nal conduct is ‘an experienced prediction based on a host of variables’ which 
cannot be readily codified.”133 That said, proponents of risk-assessment in-
struments have identified several characteristics that have such a positive cor-
relation. Criminologists note that a defendant’s following characteristics paral-
lel recidivism: criminal companions has the strongest association; antisocial 
personality, criminogenic needs, adult criminal history, and race are highly cor-
relative; pre-adult antisocial behavior, family rearing practices, social achieve-
ment, interpersonal conflict, and current age have somewhat of a relationship; 
and substance abuse, family structure, intellectual functioning, family crimi-
nality, gender, socio-economic status of origin, and personal distress have a 
“weak-but-significant” correlation.134  
Sixth, to the degree that the actuarial risk assessments are able to accu-
rately filter offenders into different risk categories, these tools may be able to 
direct programmatic efforts and save prison beds for the high-risk, while di-
verting the low-risk to settings requiring less attention. This could save signifi-
cant taxpayer money, which is especially appealing in a time when American 
prisons are overcrowded and the costs of incarceration are of great public con-
cern. Citing Oleson, a federal district court judge wrote, “If race, gender or age 
are predictive as validated by good empirical analysis, and we truly care about 
public safety while at the same time depopulating our prisons, why wouldn’t a 
rationale [sic] sentencing system freely use race, gender or age as predictor of 
future criminality?”135 
Seventh, risk assessment tools are purported to help prevent excessive—
and therefore unjustified—punishment. In the words of law professor John 
Coffee, “it is unnecessarily cruel to impose more punishment than is minimally 
necessary to realize our incapacitory purpose. Arguably, a failure to so differ-
entiate thus becomes unconscionable.”136 Risk-assessments that capture an 
                                                                                                                           
 132 See Hyatt et al., supra note 129, at 729 (positing that actuarial risk-assessments “can help . . . 
refocus the sentencing process on the offender’s conduct and the characteristics that are most relevant 
to determining the risk to the community that they may pose”). 
 133 Schall, 467 U.S. at 279 (quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 
U.S. 1, 16 (1979)). 
 134 See J.C. Oleson, Risk in Sentencing: Constitutionally Suspect Variables and Evidence-Based 
Sentencing, 64 SMU L. REV. 1329, 1350–51 (2011). These characteristics will be evaluated in Part IV 
on the basis of a standard established in Part III. 
 135 Richard G. Kopf, Like the Ostrich That Buries Its Head in the Sand, Mr. Holder Is Wrong 
About Data-Driven Sentencing, HERCULES AND THE UMPIRE (Aug. 10, 2014), http://herculesandthe
umpire.com/2014/08/10/like-the-ostrich-that-buries-its-head-in-the-sand-mr-holder-is-wrong-about-
data-driven-sentencing, archived at http://perma.cc/H95S-UGV9. 
 136 Coffee, supra note 23, at 1005. 
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individual’s risk profile and dictate commensurate punishment are said to re-
duce the possibility that individuals will be unduly jailed or incarcerated. 
In sum, there are numerous purported benefits to actuarial risk-assessments, 
which are grounded in their empirical nature. To many, these tools carry the 
promise of objective and consistent sentencing decisions, appropriately re-
strained judicial decision-making, and an efficient deployment of strained penal 
resources. 
III. LIMITS ON RISK-ASSESSMENTS 
Having explored the benefits and increasing popularity of risk-assessment 
tools, we must now analyze their legality and propriety. This Part suggests that 
three considerations should guide an evaluation of risk-assessment tools. First, 
Section A explores whether constitutional or statutory law forbids any of the 
traits. Second, Section B examines whether the traits track individual conduct. 
Finally, Section C questions whether the traits reflect the ability of the individ-
ual to reduce, over time, his or her likelihood of recidivating. 
A. Risk-Assessments and Legal Limits 
1. Statutory Limits 
Congress enacted the SRA as a response to concerns about disparate and 
indeterminate sentencing.137 The SRA’s primary accomplishment was to estab-
lish the Sentencing Guidelines, which all federal judges must now use as the 
starting point for a sentencing determination.138 
Most relevant for our purposes, the SRA states that a judge, in imposing a 
sentence, “shall consider . . . the nature and circumstances of the offense and 
the history and characteristics of the defendant . . . .”139 This language is un-
mistakably broad. Despite this, however, the universe of offender characteris-
tics that a federal judge may weigh is not unbounded. In fact, the SRA speci-
fies that some offender characteristics are expressly prohibited from considera-
tion. The SRA states that the Guidelines must be “entirely neutral as to the 
race, sex, national origin, creed, and socioeconomic status of offenders.”140 
The Senate Report explains that this limiting provision was designed 
to make it absolutely clear that it was not the purpose of the list of 
offender characteristics set forth [above] . . . to suggest in any way 
                                                                                                                           
 137 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363–66 (1989); Doug Keller, Why the Prior 
Conviction Sentencing Enhancements in Illegal Re-Entry Cases Are Unjust and Unjustified (and Un-
reasonable Too), 51 B.C. L. REV. 719, 725 (2010). 
 138 See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007). 
 139 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2012). 
 140 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (2012). 
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that . . . it might be appropriate, for example, to afford preferential 
treatment to defendants of a particular race or religion or level of af-
fluence, or to relegate to prisons defendants who are poor, uneducat-
ed, and in need of education and vocational training.141 
Accordingly, Congress declared race, sex, national origin, religion, and socio-
economic status off-limits in risk-assessment instruments in the federal sys-
tem.142 
While the SRA only governs the federal system, it may be instructive for 
the states as well. Most states have not announced their respective punishment 
goals,143 but those who have seem to embody the same general philosophical 
justifications for criminal sanction.144 Accordingly, Congress’s view of these 
factors may illuminate whether and to what extent states should be able to 
adopt the same factors in their respective risk-assessment tools. That is, the 
federal view of these characteristics can inform whether and how to apply 
these traits in state sentencing systems. 
As such, the rest of this Part provides grounds to curb risk-assessment 
tools in both the state and federal systems. For now, it is established that the 
SRA, by its own terms, forbids the use of race, sex, national origin, religion, 
socio-economic status in federal sentencing, including penal evaluations of an 
individual’s propensity to recidivate. 
2. Constitutional Limits 
Constitutional considerations limit many factors often used in risk-
assessment tools. In both federal and state sentencing, risk-assessment tools must 
comply with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
equal protection guarantee that has been read into the Fifth Amendment.145 Ac-
cording to the Supreme Court, “the Equal Protection Clause . . . is essentially a 
                                                                                                                           
 141 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 171 (1983). 
 142 Parts III.B and C will provide additional, independently sufficient reasons why these factors 
cannot be included in risk-assessments, cementing the argument that these five factors are inappropri-
ate for predictive purposes. See infra notes 193–275 and accompanying text. 
 143 See State v. Roth, 471 A.2d 370, 376 (N.J. 1984) (“Our Legislature has not stated the aims to 
be achieved by punishment. Indeed few Legislatures have, and where they have, the statement has 
been too general to be of service.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 144 See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-101 (2013) (setting forth Montana’s sentencing policy, 
which enumerates the four traditional purposes of punishment); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1.05(6) (McKin-
ney 2009) (noting the utilitarian reasons for punishment); Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944, 956 (Nev. 
1989) (noting the four purposes of punishment). 
 145 U.S. CONST. amend V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law . . . .”); id. § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.”); see Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499–500 (1954) (explaining that 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment contains an equal protection component applicable to 
the federal government). For convenience, this Article uses the “Equal Protection Clause” or “Equal 
Protection” as shorthand for these complementary constitutional provisions. 
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direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.”146 This prin-
ciple, however, is not absolute. Indeed, there are circumstances under which a 
government actor may treat similarly situated individuals differently in a manner 
consistent with the Equal Protection Clause.147 
a. Suspect Classifications 
When the government treats similarly situated individuals differently be-
cause of race,148 national origin,149 or religion,150 courts require a “compelling” 
justification for the differential treatment and ask the government to demon-
strate that the means chosen are “narrowly tailored” to further the compelling 
end.151 This level of review is known as “strict scrutiny.” The Supreme Court 
has identified a limited set of reasons that are sufficiently “compelling” to jus-
tify differential treatment on the basis of these suspect classifications. First, the 
Court has held that an institution of higher education may consider race in ad-
missions in order to achieve the educational benefits of a diverse student 
body.152 Second, an employer may use race to remedy past discrimination for 
which it is responsible.153 Third, in deference to national security exigencies, 
the Court has permitted the government to consider race in the execution of 
wartime policies, such as the internment of individuals of Japanese ancestry 
during World War II.154 The Court has also held that strict scrutiny is the prop-
                                                                                                                           
 146 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 449 (1985). 
 147 See Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 602 (2008) (“When those who appear simi-
larly situated are nevertheless treated differently, the Equal Protection Clause requires at least a ra-
tional reason for the difference, to ensure that all persons subject to legislation or regulation are indeed 
being ‘treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions.’”). A classic example of the Supreme 
Court rejecting an Equal Protection challenge is Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc. See 348 U.S. 
483 (1955). 
 148 See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978) (plurality opinion) (“[When 
government decisions] touch upon an individual’s race or ethnic background, [a plaintiff] is entitled to 
a judicial determination that the burden he is asked to bear on that basis is precisely tailored to serve a 
compelling governmental interest.”). 
 149 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (“[W]hen a statute classifies by race, alienage, or national 
origin . . . such discrimination is unlikely to be soon rectified by legislative means, these laws are 
subjected to strict scrutiny and will be sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling 
state interest.”). 
 150 See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (holding that “a classification . . . 
drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage” is reviewed under strict 
scrutiny). 
 151 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (“Federal racial classifica-
tions, like those of a State, must serve a compelling governmental interest, and must be narrowly tai-
lored to further that interest.”). 
 152 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 322–44 (2003). 
 153 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498–506 (1989). 
 154 See generally Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the legality of 
internment of Japanese-Americans); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (upholding the 
legality of a curfew on individuals of Japanese descent).While Korematsu has not been overruled, it 
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er standard that governs an Equal Protection challenge to administrative racial 
segregation by penal institutions.155 In clarifying only the applicable standard 
of review, the Court did not, on the merits, approve the use of race in the penal 
context. 
Actuarial risk profiles on the rates of recidivism for particular races, na-
tional origins, or religions are facial classifications. For example, assessments 
of the rates of recidivism for African-Americans, Mexicans, or Muslims con-
stitute facial racial, national origin, and religion classifications, respectively. 
Courts therefore would apply strict scrutiny to these risk-assessments. The Su-
preme Court’s Equal Protection jurisprudence makes clear that the use of race, 
national origin, or religion by the government is permissible only in the three 
contexts just mentioned: to ensure a diverse student body in higher education, 
to remedy past discrimination for which an employer is responsible, and to 
respond to public safety emergencies. These exceptions do not include the use 
of suspect classifications for general public safety purposes, including criminal 
sentencing.156 Nor does the Court’s ruling that administrative racial segrega-
tion in prisons be subject to strict scrutiny offer any hope of the creation of an 
additional exception that may encompass the reduction of recidivism. This is 
because that case concerned the proper placement or location of individuals 
once in prison, as opposed to whether an individual should be in prison in the 
first place, a major focus of risk-prediction instruments. 
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence leaves no room for race-conscious 
risk-assessment tools. Moreover, in reading separate opinions from individual 
Justices, one may count five sitting Justices who would prohibit the use of race 
in actuarial risk-assessment instruments. In the 2011 United States Supreme 
Court case Buck v. Thaler, Justice Samuel Alito issued a statement respecting 
the denial of certiorari, joined by Justices Stephen Breyer and Antonin Scal-
ia.157 In that case, an African-American man “was sentenced to death based on 
the jury’s finding that the State had proved [the man’s] future dangerousness to 
society.”158 At the sentencing phase, a psychologist provided expert testimony 
                                                                                                                           
nonetheless has been recognized as wrongly decided. See An Act to Implement Recommendations on 
Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, Pub. L. No. 100-383, § 1(2), 102 Stat. 903 (1988) 
(codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989a(a) (2012)) (apologizing for the Japanese internment); Korematsu 
v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1409 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (vacating Korematsu’s conviction). 
 155 See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505–15 (2005). For more information, see generally 
Symposium, The Long Shadow of Korematsu, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1 passim (1998). 
 156 Some may argue that the national security exception to race-based discrimination—identified 
most notably in Korematsu—covers threats to public safety, which risk-assessments ostensibly ad-
dress. In response, this Article would stress that the emergency wartime situation of Korematsu is 
qualitatively different than the general public safety concern that animates risk-assessment inquiries. 
See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218 (acknowledging that the race-based practices at issue could be consti-
tutionally justify only by the “gravest imminent danger to the public safety”). 
 157 132 S. Ct. 32, 32 (2011) (statement of Alito, J.). 
 158 Id. at 33. 
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that African-Americans are “statistically more likely than the average person to 
engage in crime.”159 These three Justices called this testimony “bizarre,” “ob-
jectionable,” and “offensive.”160 Nonetheless, these same Justices agreed for 
procedural reasons that the denial of certiorari was proper.161 Justices Sonia 
Sotomayor and Elena Kagan dissented, asserting that the ”relevant testimony 
was inappropriately race-charged” and that further review was warranted.162 
These opinions suggest that at least five Justices seem poised to invalidate the 
race-based statistics in sentencing if the proper case reaches the Court.163 
Outside the Supreme Court, legal scholars have come to divergent, and 
largely incorrect, positions on whether risk-assessment tools that include sus-
pect characteristics are consistent with the Equal Protection Clause. It has been 
suggested that predictive tools that include a suspect characteristic “likely 
would be upheld,” citing two cases in which the Supreme Court allowed the 
government to use ethnicity in its formal decision-making.164 
But, the cases cited for this proposition involve border agents using eth-
nicity to identify undocumented immigrants at the border or a border check-
point. Yet the issue of the border brings a unique set of circumstances that 
place these cases in a different category altogether. Indeed, in one of the cases, 
the Court clarified that, “Our decision in this case takes into account the spe-
cial function of the Border Patrol . . . .”165 As such, border searches in the im-
migration context cannot be expanded to encompass the use of race in risk 
predictions in ordinary settings. 
It has been similarly argued that race-conscious risk-assessment tools sur-
vive constitutional scrutiny in light of affirmative action principles.166 Just as 
the United States Supreme Court in 2003 in Grutter v. Bollinger allowed col-
leges and universities to use race as one factor among many in furtherance of 
                                                                                                                           
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. at 33–35. 
 161 See id. at 35. 
 162 Id. at 38 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Justice Sotomayor also pointed 
out that, in a similar case, the state had conceded error, admitting that “it is inappropriate to allow race 
to be considered as a factor in our criminal justice system.” Id. at 36 (internal quotes and citation omit-
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 163 These views suggest that is of no constitutional significance that the risk-assessment may be 
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 164 Tonry, supra note 92, at 169 (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 873 
(1975), and United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 543 (1976)). 
 165 Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 883. 
 166 Oleson, supra note 134, at 1382–87. 
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the objective of promoting a diverse student body, it is argued that sentencers 
may use race and other suspect characteristics as a factor in risk predictions.167 
This view acknowledges that Grutter involved the higher education context,168 
but asserts nonetheless that sentencers could surmount strict scrutiny because 
the Supreme Court has stated that “the legitimate and compelling state interest 
in protecting the community from crime cannot be doubted.”169 
But the case from which this quote comes, Schall v. Martin, concerned 
whether a juvenile could be subject to pretrial detention where the juvenile 
posed a “serious risk” of committing a crime before his or her return date.170 
The case therefore exemplifies an exigent public safety exception to the gen-
eral rule prohibiting the use of race.171 Indeed, the named plaintiff in the case 
was detained a total of fifteen days,172 meaning that the detention was justified 
on the basis of the belief that the plaintiff would have committed a crime with-
in fifteen days. Further, the Court explained that the pretrial detention was reg-
ulatory, not punitive,173 which makes the case less applicable to the sentences 
that can be facilitated by race-conscious risk-assessment tools. As the case 
concerns imminent public safety threats and is not punitive in nature, it is read-
ily distinguishable from the general criminal risk-assessment context.174 
Risk-assessment tools, academics have noted, amount to impermissible 
generalizations about individuals that cannot be cured by highlighting the as-
sessments’ statistical nature.175 
In short, race-conscious risk-assessments are at odds with the Equal Protec-
tion Clause as interpreted by the Supreme Court.176 The same goes for risk-
                                                                                                                           
 167 See id. at 1377 (“[S]uspect classifications might operate as ‘plus factors,’ allowing judges to 
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155 (1960), for the proposition that crime prevention is a compelling state interest. See Oleson, supra 
note 134, at 1385. In Terry, however, the Supreme Court only said that “effective crime prevention 
and detection” is a “legitimate” state interest. 392 U.S. at 22. And in De Veau, the Court did identify a 
“legitimate and compelling state interest, namely, the interest in combatting local crime infesting a 
particular industry.” 363 U.S. at 155 (emphasis added). That “particular industry” was unions. See id. 
at 145 (describing the provision of the Waterfront Commission Act at issue, which regulated labor 
organization activities). 
 175 See Starr, supra note 18, at 823–827. Part II.B. of this Article asserts that risk-assessment tools 
are not narrowly tailored. 
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assessments that include classifications on the basis of national origin or reli-
gion. The Court has stated unambiguously that race and religion are “factors that 
are constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant to the sentencing pro-
cess.”177 This should put to rest any suggestion that these traits are constitution-
ally appropriate in risk-assessments. To be sure, risk-assessment tools that do not 
include suspect characteristics on their face would survive a constitutional chal-
lenge even if the application of the tools has a disproportionate effect on certain 
races, national origins, or religions.178 To find that a facially neutral statute vio-
lates the Equal Protection Clause, the statute must be motivated by an impermis-
sible purpose.179 Here, there is no indication that risk-assessment tools are driven 
by animus or any other illegitimate reason. Rather, these instruments are clearly 
used to control crime. As a result, facially neutral risk-assessments would likely 
survive a constitutional attack. 
b. Sex 
Beyond the suspect classes of race, religion, and national origin, the Su-
preme Court has held that classifications of individuals based on sex must satisfy 
intermediate scrutiny in order to comport with the Equal Protection Clause. This 
standard requires that the sex-based classification serve an “important” govern-
mental interest and the means chosen be “substantially” related to the further-
                                                                                                                           
 176 In defense of risk-assessment tools, Judge Kopf writes, “if we believe that public safety is or 
should be a central goal of our criminal justice system we ought not to ignore the truth–certain charac-
teristics that we have shied away from in the past because we worried too much about vague notions 
of ‘equality’ or ‘fairness’ tell us a lot about future danger.” See Kopf, supra note 135. This Article’s 
objection to risk-assessment tools is not based on these terms, but on constitutional and statutory law 
as well as notions of individual autonomy. 
 177 Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885 (1983). 
 178 Others have nonetheless criticized risk-assessment tools’ disparate impact on racial minorities. 
See, e.g., HARCOURT, supra note 22, at 145–72; Jessica M. Eaglin, Against Neorehabilitation, 66 
SMU L. REV. 189, 215 (2013) (“Actuarial tools potentially exacerbate racial disparities because the 
typical risk factors used to screen offenders for rehabilitative programming are often proxies for struc-
tural inequities disproportionately plaguing historically disadvantaged populations.”); Bernard Har-
court, Risk as Proxy for Race, CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming) (manuscript at 2), availa-
ble at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract_id=1677654, archived at http://perma.cc/8RQM-JLUW (rejecting 
the notion that risk-assessments should be used to reduce the prison population, as their use will only 
exacerbate existing racial disparities in our criminal justice system); Holder Remarks, supra note 28 
(expressing concern that risk-assessment tools on the front-end may “exacerbate unwarranted and 
unjust disparities . . . in our criminal justice system and in our society”). For a response, see Shima 
Baradaran, Race, Prediction, and Discretion, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 157, 192 (2013) (“prediction is 
not necessarily discriminatory”); see also id. at 206 (“[F]ind[ing] little support that judges use prior 
record as a proxy for race.”); id. at 207 (“[W]hile race and prior record are clearly correlated, it may 
be that judges are using race as a proxy for risk rather than risk as a proxy for race.”). 
 179 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). It is for this reason that one Note has 
said, correctly, that “selective incapacitation schemes are probably immune to attack on equal protec-
tion grounds as long as they do not utilize suspect classifications as predictive criteria.” Note, supra 
note 82, at 519. 
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ance of that interest.180 With respect to the first prong of this test, the Court re-
quires “a party seeking to uphold a statute that expressly discriminates on the 
basis of sex to advance an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ for the chal-
lenged classification.”181 
In addition to the three “compelling” interests discussed above that are 
included a fortiori in this more relaxed standard, the Court has recognized that 
a public employer may engage in sex-conscious hiring practices in order to 
address general gender discrimination in society, not just gender discrimination 
for which the employer is responsible.182 A risk-assessment, however, cannot 
be subsumed under this employer-specific justification for sex-based classifi-
cations, and thus would fail intermediate scrutiny. 
The United States Supreme Court’s 1962 ruling in Robinson v. Califor-
nia183 reinforces the impermissibility of including race, national origin, and sex 
in risk-assessments. In Robinson, the Court invalidated a state law that subject-
ed an individual to criminal punishment for being a drug addict.184 The Court 
held that the mere status of being a drug addict, where the addiction may have 
been obtained “innocently or involuntarily,” could not serve as a constitutional 
basis for punishment.185 By the same token, an individual’s status as a member 
of a particular race, birth in a specific country, or membership to a given sex, is 
wholly involuntarily and thus cannot inform the length or type of punishment. 
As race, national origin, and gender receive heightened attention compared to 
substance abuse in our constitutional system, sentencing practices that factor 
race, national origin, or sex arguably are even more problematic than the law at 
issue in Robinson. 
c. Socio-Economic Status 
Whereas classifications based on race, national origin, religion, and sex 
are presumptively unconstitutional,186 different treatment premised on socio-
economic status enjoys a presumption of constitutionality.187 Classifications 
                                                                                                                           
 180 See Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981). 
 181 Id. (citations omitted). 
 182 See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977) (per curiam) (“Reduction of the disparity 
in economic condition between men and women caused by the long history of discrimination” consti-
tutes “an important governmental objective.”) (citations omitted). 
 183 See 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962). 
 184 See id. at 667. 
 185 Id. 
 186 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 152 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(“[O]ur case law does reveal a strong presumption that gender classifications are invalid.”); Pers. 
Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) (“Certain classifications . . . in themselves sup-
ply a reason to infer antipathy. Race is the paradigm. A racial classification . . . is presumptively inva-
lid and can be upheld only upon an extraordinary justification.”). 
 187 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 61–62 (1972) (Stewart, J., con-
curring). 
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based on wealth or poverty are subject to rational basis review, which requires 
the government to prove only that the purpose for the classification is “legiti-
mate” and that the means used is “rationally related” to the purpose.188 
Here, risk-assessment tools would be justified on public safety grounds, a 
legitimate governmental interest.189 The utilization of statistical averages that 
the poor recidivate at higher levels, and thus present a higher risk of re-
offending, is rationally related to public safety.190 Accordingly, socio-economic 
status does not seem to offend the constitutional guarantee of Equal Protection, 
despite the fact that the SRA bans the use of socio-economic status as a factor 
in determining sentencing. 
* * * 
In sum, Congress, pursuant to the SRA, has forbidden the use of race, sex, 
national origin, religion, and socio-economic status in federal sentencing. This 
ban covers risk-assessments utilized in sentencing in the federal system. Equal 
Protection analysis provides another, independently-sufficient basis for prohib-
iting the use of race, national origin, religion, and sex in federal and state risk-
assessments. The result is that five of the seventeen factors analyzed in this 
Article should be deemed off-limits in any federal risk-assessment and four of 
seventeen in any state risk-assessment (socio-economic status would likely 
pass constitutional muster in a state system). 
B. Risk-Assessments Ignore Individual Action 
This section introduces an additional argument that, if considered, would 
call for the removal of these and other factors from predictions of risk in sen-
tencing. This argument has two components. First, it is inappropriate to tie 
punishment to group identity and group membership rather than individual 
conduct. Second, it is inappropriate to punish the individual for that over 
which the individual has no meaningful control. Risk-assessment tools directly 
conflict with these dual concepts. 
1. Punishment and Individual Action 
The principle against individual punishment for group identity is itself the 
product of four subsidiary points. First, risk-assessments expressly premise pun-
ishment on group identity rather than individual conduct. This creates problems 
                                                                                                                           
 188 See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319–320 (1993). 
 189 See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 102–13 (2003). 
 190 It should be noted that rational basis is a very forgiving standard. See Heller, 509 U.S. at 319–
20 (a classification subject to rational basis review “is accorded a strong presumption of validity” and 
“must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts 
that could provide a rational basis for the classification”) (citations and internal quotes omitted). 
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by grounding punishment in something other than the purposes of punishment 
described in Part I. Second, risk-assessments, which ascribe a blanket risk profile 
to all individuals in a group may not capture the actual, diverse risk profiles of 
individuals within the group. Troublingly, all members of a group are branded 
with a monolithic risk score. Third, certain factors may be relevant or irrelevant 
as a general matter in sentencing, but the risk-assessment tools treat each factor 
as categorically relevant because of statistical correlation despite the particular-
ized circumstances of an offender’s situation. Thus, the system fails to distin-
guish when a trait is actually relevant in an individual case. Fourth, certain other 
factors are not premised on conduct—an essential requirement in criminal law—
but rather on the viewpoints or attitudes of the individual, which should not or-
dinarily give rise to punishment in the absence of action. This creates problems 
by punishing an individual’s thoughts and feelings, and not his or her external 
conduct. Taken together, these issues raise enormous concerns, both constitu-
tional and otherwise. 
a. Personal Conduct 
To begin, the law requires that the state must inflict punishment on an in-
dividual because of the individual’s conduct, and not group membership. “In 
our jurisprudence guilt is personal,”191 held the Supreme Court; “guilt by asso-
ciation remains a thoroughly discredited doctrine . . . .”192 Similarly, Justice 
Robert H. Jackson wrote, “if any fundamental assumption underlies our sys-
tem, it is that guilt is personal,” and not associational.193 
Even conspiracy doctrine,194 which allows individuals to be punished for 
knowing participation in certain group behavior, highlights the importance of 
guilt attaching to personal conduct and not the disconnected behavior of oth-
ers. Justice Jackson, acknowledging that “guilt is personal” and admonishing 
against resorting to “guilt by association,” wrote that for purposes of conspira-
cy “personal guilt may be incurred by joining a conspiracy” and that the per-
sonal “act of association makes one responsible for the acts of others commit-
                                                                                                                           
 191 Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 224–25 (1961). 
 192 Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 79 (1959). 
 193 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 243 (Jackson, J., dissenting). He said this in the context of the gov-
ernment’s forced exclusion and displacement of individuals of Japanese ancestry in the wake of the 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, where liberty was restricted because of ancestry alone, not individual 
action. See id. If this principle should not apply when the state interests are ostensibly at their maxi-
mum, it cannot apply a fortiori to ordinary criminal situations. 
 194 The Model Penal Code defines conspiracy as follows: “A person is guilty of conspiracy with 
another person or persons to commit a crime if with the purpose of promoting or facilitating its com-
mission he (a) agrees with such other person or persons that they or one or more of them will engage 
in conduct that constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime; or (b) agrees 
to aid such other person or persons in the planning or commission of such crime or of an attempt or 
solicitation to commit such crime.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(1) (1985). 
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ted in pursuance of the association.”195 The law punishes the act of joining, not 
the mere association with a criminal group. Accordingly, the predicate for pun-
ishing an individual for the actions of a group is the individual decision to be 
part of the group and specifically a common enterprise. 
Risk-assessment tools sever the critical link between personal action and 
personal punishment, subjecting the individual to punishment solely for the 
group’s propensity to recidivate.196 As Justice Hugo Black noted, “the funda-
mental requirement that some action be proved is solidly established even for 
offenses most heavily based on propensity, such as attempt, conspiracy, and 
recidivist crimes.”197 
b. Blanket Treatment 
Worse, risk-assessment tools treat individuals as monolithic members of a 
group who pose an identical threat to public safety regardless of their particu-
lar or actual danger to society.198 Indeed, assessors take averages as predictive 
measures and then assign these averages to each member of the group.199 
Ascribing the same trait or characteristic to all individuals within a group 
offends common sense and creates grave constitutional problems. Take, for ex-
ample, the monolithic treatment of a group based on racial characteristics. The 
Supreme Court, in one instance, struck down planned voting districts that “rein-
force[d] the perception that members of the same racial group—regardless of 
their age, education, economic status, or the community in which they live—
think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates 
                                                                                                                           
 195 Am. Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 433 (1950) (Jackson, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (emphases added). 
 196 See Sonja Starr, Sentencing, by the Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2014, at A17 (“The basic 
problem is that the risk scores are not based on the defendant’s crime. They are primarily or wholly 
based on prior characteristics: criminal history (a legitimate criterion), but also factors unrelated to 
conduct.”). 
 197 Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 543 (1968) (Black, J., concurring). This concern touches all of 
the factors that are used in risk-assessments, because the nature of those assessments is to predict 
future criminal behavior in light of present and past conduct; that future crime may never occur. Ac-
cordingly, there may not be any legitimate predicate for punishment, other than theoretical chances of 
future criminal conduct. It is problematic to premise punishment on numbers and possibility, rather 
than action. See id. This concern is particularly heightened where, as here, the factor implicates what 
someone thinks or how someone views the world around him. 
 198 See Daniel S. Goodman, Note, Demographic Evidence in Capital Sentencing, 39 STAN. L. 
REV. 499, 522–23 (1987) (objecting to demographic generalization in the capital context that “classi-
fies defendants on the basis of their affiliation with broad social groups, disregarding the fact that 
individual behavior may deviate substantially from average group behavior”). 
 199 See Jessica Pishko, Punished for Being Poor: The Problem with Using Big Data in the Justice 
System, PAC. STANDARD MAG. (Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.psmag.com/navigation/politics-and-law/
punished-poor-problem-using-big-data-justice-system-88651/, archived at https://perma.cc/6GP8-
RQ57?type=pdf (“Data always relies on averages. As a result, some people are bound to behave dif-
ferently than the data predicts . . . .”). 
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at the polls.”200 “[S]uch perceptions,” the Court declared, must be rejected “as 
impermissible racial stereotypes.”201 Similarly, the Court admonished, “racial 
bloc voting and minority-group political cohesion never can be assumed . . . .”202 
The Court emphasized that, “the individual is important, not his race, his creed, 
or his color.”203 Accordingly, if it is impermissible to assume that individuals of 
the same race think or vote alike, the assertion that individuals of the same race 
will act alike should be condemned as well. Indeed, in another redistricting case, 
the Court stated, “[t]he idea is a simple one: At the heart of the Constitution’s 
guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that the Government 
must treat citizens as individuals, not as simply components of a racial, religious, 
sexual or national class.”204 
These cases support the principle that group membership by itself cannot 
be used as a proxy for behavior applicable to all members of the group; indi-
viduals within the group are not fungible, undifferentiated parts of a whole. 
These cases also point to the need for decision-makers in the criminal justice 
system to focus not on group identity but individual behavior.205 
Each of the seventeen major characteristics used in risk-assessment tools 
would fall short of the low standard that punishment track particularized con-
duct. This is because actuarial data, by their nature, are averages—and are not 
based on the individualized behavior of those within the group. 
c. Automatic Relevance 
In an actuarial approach, all the factors in an offender’s risk profile are 
considered automatically relevant in determining his or her sentence. This ap-
proach is problematic in that the individual circumstances of the offender may 
justify the consideration of only some factors that may otherwise correlate with 
recidivism. Risk-assessment tools do not contemplate such individualization. 
                                                                                                                           
 200 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993). 
 201 Id. 
 202 Id. at 653. But see Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 
VA. L. REV. 1413, 1468 (1991) (“The assumption that blacks, wherever they reside, tend to be politi-
cally cohesive is supported both anecdotally and empirically.”). 
 203 Shaw, 509 U.S. at 648 (internal quotes and citation omitted). 
 204 Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995) (quoting Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 
U.S. 547, 602 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)) (internal quotes and citations omitted); see also 
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991) (“where racial bias is likely to influence a jury, an inquiry 
must be made into such bias,” rather than presumed solely from the racial identity of the prospective 
juror); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 104 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring) (holding that the state 
may not “tak[e] any action based on crude, inaccurate racial stereotypes,” such as the stereotype that 
jurors would be sympathetic to defendants of the same race). 
 205 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984) (concluding that such group-assigned traits 
“force[] individuals to labor under stereotypical notions that often bear no relationship to their actual 
abilities”). 
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In the SRA, Congress stated that four factors—i.e., education and voca-
tional skills, employment record, family ties and responsibility, and communi-
ty ties—are “generally inappropriate” as to recommending a term or length of 
imprisonment.206 That is, according to the SRA, these factors generally should 
not be relevant in sentencing, but may be relevant in “exceptional cases.”207 
While Congress takes these four factors almost off the table, risk-assessment 
tools construe them (and all other factors) as categorically relevant predictors 
of risk because of their correlation with recidivism. 
Similarly, Congress directed the Commission to determine whether and to 
what degree several offender characteristics are “relevant” to sentencing.208 In 
response, the Commission found that most of the factors—known as Section 
5H factors in reference to a section of the Guidelines Manual—such as age, 
mental and emotional condition, physical condition (including drug or alcohol 
abuse), and the defendant’s criminal history, are relevant for sentencing.209 
Other Section 5H factors, such as education and vocational skills, family ties 
and responsibilities, are “not ordinarily relevant” in sentencing,210 though they 
may be relevant in “exceptional cases.”211 By contrast, risk-assessment tools 
would dictate that all these factors are categorically relevant because they cor-
relate with possible future recidivating. 
The Supreme Court’s discussion of Section 5H factors further undercuts 
the risk-assessment tools’ one-size-fits-all approach to offender characteristics. 
In Koon v. United States, the United States Supreme Court stated that in the 
“heartland” of cases, the generally “discouraged” Section 5H factors may not 
be relevant in sentencing. Indeed, these factors may be relevant “only if the 
factor is present to an exceptional degree or in some other way makes the case 
different from the ordinary case where the factor is present.”212 Again, risk-
assessment tools lack this nuance, would eliminate the heartland/exceptional 
framework, and reduce a factor to a single landscape of actuarial relevance. 
                                                                                                                           
 206 28 U.S.C. § 994(e) (2012). The statute lists education and vocational skills as separate charac-
teristics, though for present purposes these two characteristics are consolidated. See id. 
 207 See GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 57, § 5K2.0, cmt. n. 3(c). 
 208 See 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (the characteristics are: age; education; vocational skills; mental and 
emotional condition to the extent that such condition mitigates the defendant’s culpability or to the 
extent that such condition is otherwise plainly relevant; physical condition, including drug depend-
ence; previous employment record; family ties and responsibilities; community ties; role in the of-
fense; criminal history; and degree of dependence upon criminal activity for a livelihood). 
 209 See GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 57, § 5H1.4–.5 (adding that “[s]ubstance abuse is high-
ly correlated to an increased propensity to commit crime,” and clarifying that employment record 
“may be relevant in determining the conditions of probation or supervised release,” but is “not ordi-
narily relevant in determining whether a departure is warranted”). 
 210 See id. § 5H1.6 (clarifying that family responsibilities “that are complied with may be relevant 
to the determination of the amount of restitution or fine”). 
 211 See id. § 5K2.0, cmt. n. 3(c). 
 212 Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96 (1996). 
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In short, the value of risk-assessment tools is confined to separating groups 
from one another; learning, for example, that one group on average is more like-
ly to recidivate than another group. This crude, blunt measure says very little, 
however, about how individuals within the groups will perform and how deci-
sion-makers should respond to such unrefined predictions of performance. 
d. Absence of Conduct 
Risk-assessments may also subject individuals to higher punishment 
simply because the individual may think in anti-social ways. But one who has 
not acted in breach of the criminal law should not be subject to criminal pun-
ishment at all, even if one has thoughts or perspectives that are hostile to others 
or to society. Criminal laws generally have two constituent components: an 
evil mind and an evil hand.213 To be punished, an individual’s evil mind must 
manifest itself through evil action of some kind. Punishing an individual for 
possessing an evil mind alone—that is, views or attitudes seen as aggressive or 
hostile—would collapse the twin requirements of criminal law and eliminate 
the essential requirement that the evil mind induce some kind of evil action.214 
Justice Black, for one, decried this treatment as “obnoxious,” noting in Powell 
v. Texas that the “mental element is not simply one part of the crime but may 
constitute all of it”—a situation that is “universally sought to be avoided in our 
criminal law.”215 
Moreover, our tradition of individual freedom in America allows a person 
to select from the vast universe of ideas or attitudes and act on these ideas 
without government interference, provided that he or she stays within the lim-
its of the law.216 Relatedly, unorthodox views or perspectives should be valued 
                                                                                                                           
 213 Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251–52 (1952). 
 214 One may suggest that hate crimes are a category of criminal laws that prohibit “evil mind,” 
that is, selecting a victim on the basis of the victim’s disfavored traits. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Mitch-
ell, 508 U.S. 476, 489–90 (1993) (upholding a hate crimes statute despite its First Amendment impli-
cations); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 377 (1992) (invalidating a hate crimes statute on 
First Amendment grounds). But valid hate crimes statutes are still predicated on action, though the 
victim may have been selected for the action on the basis of a protected characteristic. The Matthew 
Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, for example, makes it unlawful for anyone 
to “willfully cause[] bodily injury” or “attempt to cause bodily injury to any person,” because of an 
individual’s race, color, religion or national origin. 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1) (2012). 
 215 Powell, 392 U.S. at 543 (Black, J., concurring); see also Williamson v. United States, 184 
F.2d 280, 282 (2d Cir. 1950) (“[I]t is . . . difficult to reconcile with traditional American law the jail-
ing of persons by the courts because of anticipated but as yet uncommitted crimes. Imprisonment to 
protect society from predicted but unconsummated offenses is so unprecedented in this country and so 
fraught with danger of excesses and injustice that I am loath to resort to it . . . .”); Holder Remarks, 
supra note 28 (“[C]riminal sentencing should not be based on . . . the possibility of a future crime that 
has not taken place . . . .”). 
 216 See Barbara D. Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with Statistical 
Inference and Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408, 1437 (1979) (objecting to the functional 
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in a democratic society that depends on competing viewpoints and ways of 
life, subject again to the same criminal boundaries. Different views enrich and 
deepen our society. Accordingly, an anti-social lens through which the individ-
ual sees the world should not inform an individual’s sentence. 
* * * 
These arguments challenge the centerpiece of risk-assessment tools: the 
fact that risk predictions—and the possibility of enhanced punishment—are 
premised on the basis of an individual’s group identity or membership. There 
are ample reasons, grounded in the SRA, Commission conclusions, Court pro-
nouncements, and the utilitarian purposes of punishment, to doubt whether 
such group-based determinations are a valid means by which to justify custo-
dial decisions for the individual.217 
2. Punishment and Control 
Risk-assessment tools raise additional concerns because individuals may 
be a member of a group for no fault of their own and may be unable to change 
whether or not to be in the group. In this respect, the tools may demand pun-
ishment for a group identity over which the individual has no meaningful con-
trol.218 
Both retributionists and utilitarians believe punishment should be im-
posed on the guilty. Rawls explains that “retributionists . . . insist[] . . . that no 
man can be punished unless he is guilty, that is, unless he has broken the 
law.”219 Rawls adds that “utilitarians agree that punishment is to be inflicted 
only for the violation of law.”220 It is important to emphasize that “guilt” in this 
                                                                                                                           
inducement of punishment where “the induced behavior falls in a zone in which there is a strong so-
cial commitment to protecting an individual’s private and personal choices”). 
 217 One may claim that this subsection is, at bottom, a complaint that risk-assessments involve 
group-based, rather than individual-based, statistics, and that this concern dissipates if and when risk-
assessments include more refined, intra-group data. The following argument would apply to risk-
assessments even if the data were specified for each individual offender. See Coffee, supra note 23, at 
1008 (commenting on “the jurisprudential issues that will remain even if the methodology employed 
is as precise and narrow as possible”). 
 218 This point was raised recently by Attorney General Holder. See Holder Remarks, supra note 
28 (“[Criminal sentencing] should not be based on unchangeable factors that a person cannot control 
. . . .”). 
 219 Rawls, supra note 31, at 7. 
 220 Id. Some posit that utilitarianism would justify the punishment of the innocent. See, e.g., 
MOORE, supra note 31, at 93 (“The main problem with the pure utilitarian theory of punishment is 
that it potentially sacrifices the innocent in order to achieve a collective good.”). But at least some 
utilitarians have disavowed this charge. See, e.g., Binder & Smith, supra note 70, at 118–19 (ac-
knowledging that policies justifying punishment of the innocent “follow logically from the premises 
of utilitarianism,” but clarifying that “utilitarian penology cannot endorse punishment of the inno-
cent”). As this Article addresses itself to the use of risk-assessments for purposes of determining 
whether imprisonment is an appropriate sanction and ascertaining the proper length of imprisonment, 
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sense is the technical breach of the law, or a descriptive fact. It is not necessari-
ly a value judgment as to the qualitative nature of the breach, which words as-
sociated with retribution, such as “blameworthiness,” “desert,” and “moral re-
sponsibility,” tend to conjure up. Accordingly, both theories share the belief 
that punishment must follow guilt. 
But not all who technically violate the law are punished. A hallmark of 
any legitimate legal system is that government may punish only decisions over 
which an individual can exercise sufficient agency.221 As the Supreme Court 
has recognized, “It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as 
belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the 
normal individual to choose between good and evil.”222 Justice Byron White 
explained that, “The criminal law proceeds on the theory that defendants have 
a will and are responsible for their actions” and that individuals who “have 
chosen to engage in conduct so reprehensible and injurious to others . . . must 
be punished . . . .”223 In other words, the criminal law punishes an individual 
for choices—not thoughts—that undermine and impose harm on the public 
order.224 
Our criminal law punishes only those individuals who choose to violate 
the law. It does not, therefore, punish those who cannot make moral choices for 
themselves, such as children, the intellectually disabled, or the insane. These 
individuals are considered categorically ineligible for criminal sanction be-
cause they cannot be “blameworthy in mind”; they lack the requisite mental 
capacity to meaningfully choose between good and evil.225 Children, for ex-
ample, “are exempted from criminal liability to the extent that they have not 
yet developed into autonomous adults, and therefore lack the cognitive, emo-
tional, and practical capacity to make rational decisions for which they are 
morally accountable.”226 The intellectually disabled “do not act with the level 
                                                                                                                           
this Article assumes that the offender is guilty. It therefore avoids any dispute regarding whether utili-
tarianism would subject the innocent to criminal sanction. 
 221 See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33, 39 (1969) (explaining that “rules that require 
conduct beyond the powers of the affected party” not only “result in a bad system of law,” but also 
“result[] in something that is not properly called a system of law at all” and, further stating, “a law 
which a man cannot obey, nor act according to it, is void and no law”); see also California v. Brown, 
479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[An] emphasis on culpability in sentencing 
decisions has long been reflected in Anglo-American jurisprudence.”).’ 
 222 Morissette, 342 U.S. at 250. 
 223 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 551 (1971) (White, J., concurring); see also Booth 
v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 502 (1987) (suggesting that a sentencer cannot consider that which has no 
“bearing on the defendant’s personal responsibility and moral guilt”) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
 224 See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 37, at *2 (describing criminal violations as “public wrongs,” 
“which affect the whole community, considered as a community”) (emphases omitted). 
 225 Morissette, 342 U.S. at 252. 
 226 Sarah Abramowicz, Rethinking Parental Incarceration, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 793, 848–49 
(2011); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005) (recognizing the “diminished culpabil-
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of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious adult criminal con-
duct.”227 And the insane, who “may not be regarded as moral agents, that is, 
persons . . . are incapable of making choices that count as such because of im-
paired reasoning and judgment.”228 
In short, “It is generally agreed ‘that punishment should be directly relat-
ed to the personal culpability of the criminal defendant.’”229 As the aforemen-
tioned examples show, certain individuals lack “personal culpability” and 
therefore should not be criminally sanctioned. 
In contrast to this bedrock principle, risk-assessment instruments call for 
punishment without the individual choice that is ordinarily a prerequisite to 
criminal punishment.230 Indeed, risk-assessment tools subject a defendant to 
increased punishment because of immutable attributes, including race, sex, and 
national origin,231 traits over which the defendant has no control and possesses 
by pure accident of birth. 
The utilitarian theories of punishment generally do not support basing 
sentencing decisions on such factors. Deterrence theory holds that the offender 
and others in society should be incentivized to conform his or her behavior to 
the law. The incentive is meaningless if it is applied to a factor that the indi-
                                                                                                                           
ity of juveniles” in finding unconstitutional the imposition of capital punishment on individuals who 
were under eighteen at the time of offense); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988) (stat-
ing that “less culpability should attach to a crime committed by a juvenile than to a comparable crime 
committed by an adult,” and further stating that “[the] irresponsible conduct [of a juvenile] is not as 
morally reprehensible as that of an adult”); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115–16 (1982) (“Our 
history is replete with laws and judicial recognition that minors, especially in their earlier years, gen-
erally are less mature and responsible than adults.”). 
 227 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306, 316 (2002) (“[O]ur society views mentally retarded 
offenders as categorically less culpable than the average criminal.”). While the cases in this and the 
previous footnote arose in the context of capital sentences, they nonetheless stand for the unassailable 
proposition that diminished mental capacity diminishes culpability. See id.; supra note 226. 
 228 Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CAL. L. REV. 257, 262–63 (1987) (discussing individ-
uals who possess “inadequate capacities for making judgments and exercising choice”); see also Fran-
cis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 1004 (1932) (“Insanity, which robs one of the 
power to make intelligent choice between good and evil, must negative criminal responsibility if crim-
inality rests upon moral blameworthiness.”). Relatedly, Christopher Slobogin argues that individuals 
who experience “imperviousness” to criminal punishment—that is, who cannot be deterred from 
breaching the criminal law—may be subject to preventative civil detention. Christopher Slobogin, A 
Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2003); see Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 
346, 358 (1997) (explaining that civil confinement is permissible for “those suffer from a volitional 
impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control”). 
 229 Thompson, 487 U.S. at 834 (quoting Brown, 479 U.S. at 545 (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
 230 See Goodman, supra note 200, at 521 (“To allow a criminal defendant’s sentence to be deter-
mined to any degree by his unchosen membership in a given race or class denies the very premise of 
self-determination upon which our criminal justice system is built. It raises the threat that defendants 
will be sentenced not on the basis of their personal merit or conduct, but on the basis of their ‘sta-
tus.’”). 
 231 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting race, national 
origin, and sex are immutable characteristics). 
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vidual has no actual or meaningful ability to change. That is, incentivizing 
conduct “depends on the mutability of the characteristic that forms the basis of 
classification.”232 Where a trait is immutable—unchangeable—it obviously 
cannot be influenced to change by the criminal law. The deterrence rationale 
thus cannot justify punishment for those factors that the individual cannot ef-
fectively change. 
A similar analysis follows under a rehabilitation model of criminal pun-
ishment. Rehabilitation serves as an opportunity for the offender to change his 
or her path such that he or she may be less likely to re-offend. Rehabilitative 
programs and activities must be directed towards that which the individual can 
improve. But there are some characteristics that rehabilitative efforts cannot 
affect because they are not susceptible to individual control. For example, an 
offender will still possess the same race and national origin no matter what 
programs he or she completes. As with deterrence, rehabilitation jurisprudence 
rejects sentencing based on these immutable factors. 
By contrast, the incapacitation rationale would appear to cut the other 
way and would not be vulnerable to any such control-based limitations. Under 
pure incapacitation theory, individuals could be isolated from society if they 
presented a higher risk of re-offending, regardless of the individuals’ ability to 
change the grounds for the higher risk profile. For example, for a proponent of 
incapacitation, it is irrelevant whether an African-American cannot change his 
or her race; what matters instead is whether public safety would be served by 
punishment. Accordingly, the principal point of this subsection— that risk-
assessment tools include only those characteristics over which the offender has 
meaningful control—would seemingly have no purchase in a purely incapaci-
tational sentencing regime. 
But, as the categorical exclusion of some individuals demonstrates, our 
criminal justice system demands that criminal punishment be premised on 
those individuals who have the capacity of choice.  
The constitutional requirement of proportional sentencing reinforces the 
concept that criminal punishment cannot roam beyond that for which the indi-
vidual is responsible. As the Supreme Court said over a century ago, “it is a 
precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and propor-
tioned to offense.”233 To the extent that the incapacitation of an individual ven-
                                                                                                                           
 232 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 154–55 (1980) (“[C]lassifications geared to 
characteristics it is not within the power of the individual to change will not be amenable to immediate 
and innocent explanation in terms of altering the classifying characteristic’s incidence.”); Samuel A. 
Marcosson, Constructive Immutability, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 646, 670 (2001) (“It is doubtful that 
classifications based on immutable characteristics can or will often be relevant to government classifi-
cations as to which deterrence is the underlying goal.”). 
 233 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910); see also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 
337, 377 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“A society must punish those who transgress its rules. 
When the offense is severe, the punishment should be of proportionate severity.”). 
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tures into such territory, the sanction would lose its character as a criminal one 
and could only be supported as a civil one.234 In short, while incapacitation, on 
its own, may allow for punishment without regard to volitional capacity, the 
Constitution and Supreme Court both suggest that, in our system, such capaci-
ty is necessary for criminal sanction. 
C. Risk-Assessments Undermine Individual Autonomy 
The first section in this Part addressed the mismatch between risk-
assessment tools and individual conduct, and the second the mismatch between 
risk-assessment tools and that which the individual can control. The focus of 
this section is the mismatch between risk-assessment tools and the capacity of 
individuals to change over time. It establishes the role of individual autonomy 
in utilitarian penology, and then argues how risk-assessment tools fail to ac-
count for individual autonomy. 
1. Individual Autonomy and Utilitarianism 
Though an individual may change in some respects from one time to the 
next, the criminal law presupposes the continuity of an individual’s identity, 
such that it would be appropriate to hold the individual responsible at a second 
moment for actions taken at a prior moment. As law professor Joel Feinberg 
writes, “All of our ordinary notions of responsibility . . . presuppose a relation 
of personal identity between earlier and later stages of the same self.”235 Phi-
losopher John Locke similarly noted that individual consciousness “extends 
itself beyond present existence to what is past” and thus may be held “account-
able” for actions both past and present.236 Because of this unity of past and 
present, Locke asserts that “a sentence shall be justified by the consciousness 
all persons shall have, that they themselves, in what bodies soever they appear 
. . . .”237 
In criminal law, individual identity must be seen as constant for the 
threshold question of who to punish, as this question is interested in attribution 
or traceability of actions and related harms.238 Indeed, offenders must bear re-
                                                                                                                           
 234 See Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002) (holding that civil commitment cannot be made 
without some inquiry into the individual’s lack of control); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) 
(categorizing as civil, and upholding, a state statute authorizing the commitment of a sex offender who 
could not control his dangerousness). 
 235 Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Privacy: Moral Ideals in the Constitution?, 58 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 445, 478 (1983). 
 236 JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, bk. II, ch. xxvii, § 26, at 
276 (Peter H. Nidditch ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1975) (1689). 
 237 Id. 
 238 This first question corresponds with the first question and answer posed by Rawls in his semi-
nal discussion of rules: “Why was J put in jail yesterday?” Rawls, supra note 31, at 5. Answer: “Be-
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sponsibility for their previous criminal actions and any resultant public harm—
no one else should be forced to bear it for them. Moreover, the criminal law 
would unravel if an individual could avoid responsibility simply by claiming 
that he or she was sufficiently changed. 
But individual identity can change. And in determining an appropriate 
punishment, the criminal law may consider these changes in the individual. 
Indeed, the utilitarian theories of punishment all assume that the individual 
identity can change with time and support the flexibility of punishment in light 
of these changes. 
In particular, specific deterrence—incentivizing the offender to not recid-
ivate—suggests that an individual who is sentenced, at time-x, for a criminal 
act will be able to determine, at time-y, that the consequences of the criminal 
action are not worth whatever profits it obtained. If the individual did not have 
the capacity to deliberate and engage in this cost-benefit analysis, and if the 
individual was unable to arrive at a different conclusion than the initial deci-
sion, specific deterrence would be meaningless. This is why Plato suggested 
that “rational punishment . . . is desirous that the man who is punished, and he 
who sees him punished, may be deterred from doing wrong again,” “thereby 
clearly implying that virtue is capable of being taught.”239 Deterrence theory 
thus presupposes that an individual can acquire “virtue”—here, acting lawful-
ly.240 In short, an individual can change, and change for the better. 
Under an incapacitation rationale, incarceration is legitimate only insofar 
as, and only for long as, the individual must be segregated from society. After 
that point, incarceration cannot be justified for incapacitation reasons. In other 
words, the incapacitation theory assumes that the offender is able to become 
less of a threat to society such that custodial detention is no longer appropriate. 
In utilitarian jurisprudence, rehabilitation most strongly supports the idea 
that individuals can change. Rehabilitation rests on the promise that an individu-
al’s ability to live lawfully will be heightened over time by programs and treat-
ment. It presumes that the individual is capable of making progress over time. 
In other words, utilitarian theories of punishment all suggest that people 
are capable of some internal shift, and may exercise choice in achieving this 
progress. Our current sentencing regime recognizes this as well. Two exam-
ples: first, inmates in the federal system may obtain an earlier release by earn-
                                                                                                                           
cause he robbed the bank at B.” Id. In other words, “a particular man is punished, rather than some 
other man, because he is guilty, and he is guilty because he broke the law . . . .” Id. at 6. 
 239 PLATO, APOLOGUE OF PROTAGORAS, in 1 THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 145 (B. Jowett trans., 
New York, Oxford Univ. Press 3d ed. 1892) (c. 380 B.C.E.). 
 240 The punishment imposed on the individual may also impress upon members of the public, 
with greater force, that the costs of the crime are not worth its benefits, where this enhanced message 
again is suggestive of dynamism. 
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ing “good time” credits.241 These credits encourage positive behavior; by offer-
ing them, the federal criminal justice system demonstrates that it understands 
that inmates may take the carrot and exhibit favored behavior.242 Second, in the 
federal system, 97.2% of inmates are sentenced for less than life terms, mean-
ing that this percentage of inmates will be eligible for release back into their 
communities.243 These sentences indicate that virtually all inmates, despite ini-
tially needing punishment, will at some point be deemed able to live in society 
without being a threat to public safety, and able to display the skills and tools 
necessary to stay within legal boundaries. 
In sum, ideals of utilitarianism and individual autonomy support the no-
tion that individuals may change and make positive choices. Individuals can 
and do change. 
2. Individual Autonomy and Risk-Assessments 
Predictions of future criminal behavior also have a temporal component: 
they consist of attempts to forecast, at sentencing, the future dangerousness of 
the individual at release. But risk-assessment tools discount the potential of the 
individual to develop over time, undermining the individual’s autonomy. That 
is, risk-assessment tools are stuck at sentencing: they assess an individual’s 
likelihood of future dangerousness by examining various characteristics that 
might change over time. 
This creates undeniable tension between actuarial techniques and individ-
ual autonomy. This conflict has been highlighted: “To imprison a person be-
cause of the crimes he is expected to commit denies him the opportunity to 
choose to avoid those crimes . . . .”244 “[R]espect for individual autonomy,” it 
is added, “requires recognition of the possibility that an individual can choose 
to refute any prediction about himself.”245 In a similar point, it is argued that a 
restraint on liberty that is based on prediction “precludes the individual from 
taking steps to defeat the prediction and make the ‘right’ moral choice,” “as-
sume[s] a fixed future,” and “destroy[s] the opportunity for individual self-
determination—precluding the possibility that individuals can demonstrate 
                                                                                                                           
 241 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1) (2012) (allowing for 54 days of “good time” credit per year, for in-
mates with sentences of at least one year). 
 242 Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474, 482 (2010) (explaining that the credits offer an “incentive” 
for inmates to comply with prison rules and that the credits “reward[] and reinforce[] a readily identi-
fiable period of good behavior”). 
 243 Sentences Imposed, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, http://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statistics_
inmate_sentences.jsp, archived at https://perma.cc/GNK6-UKJD?type=image (last updated Jan. 24, 
2015) (providing federal prison statistics based on data from December, 2014). 
 244 Underwood, supra note 218, at 1414. 
 245 Id. 
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their moral goodness and choose a course of action that differs from the pre-
diction.”246 
In our system, to assign criminal responsibility, individual identity must 
remain constant; yet as noted above, individuals may change over time. This 
reality complicates the business of risk prediction. A law professor notes that, 
“[a]s time passes, increasingly weak psychological connections might exist with 
the past dangerous criminal,” which may “result in needlessly confining a pres-
ently nondangerous person.”247 From this perspective, “The accuracy of danger-
ousness predictions has an inverse relationship to the length of commitment or 
confinement.”248 In other words, recidivism can decline with time.249 
The recent 2011 United States Supreme Court case of Pepper v. United 
States illustrates these principles.250 James Pepper was convicted of violating a 
federal drug conspiracy statute, 21 U.S.C. § 846, and sentenced to twenty-four 
months in prison251 The Supreme Court recounted that, “At the time of his ini-
tial sentencing in 2004, Pepper was a 25-year-old drug addict who was unem-
ployed, estranged from his family, and had recently sold drugs as part of a 
methamphetamine conspiracy . . . .”252 But, when Pepper had been resentenced 
in 2009, the Court observed, “Pepper had been drug-free for nearly five years, 
had attended college and achieved high grades, was a top employee at his job 
and slated for a promotion, had re-established a relationship with his father, 
and was married and supporting his wife’s daughter.”253 
Pepper’s “exemplary”254 post-sentence conduct shows individual auton-
omy in action. Importantly, the Court noted that Pepper’s transformation 
“sheds light on the likelihood that he will engage in future criminal conduct 
                                                                                                                           
 246 Jennifer C. Daskal, Pre-Crime Restraints: The Explosion of Targeted, Noncustodial Preven-
tion, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 327, 364 (2014). As Daskal makes this argument in the context of noncus-
todial restraints on liberty, the force of this point is heightened with respect to the custodial restraints, 
such as pre-trial detention or post-conviction imprisonment, that are the subject of this Article. See id. 
 247 Rebecca Dresser, Personal Identity and Punishment, 70 B.U. L. REV. 395, 423, 443 (1990) 
(“[I]f the person subject to punishment has enough in common with the offender . . . then a plausible 
moral foundation exists for the later person’s punishment.”). See generally Steven Mazie, The Waiting 
Game, ECONOMIST (May 29, 2014), http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2014/05/
death-row, archived at http://perma.cc/W4PE-PYUA (discussing the disconnect between the individ-
ual and the “past self” in the context of sentencing). 
 248 Meghan Shapiro, An Overdose of Dangerousness: How “Future Dangerousness” Catches the 
Least Culpable Capital Defendants and Undermines the Rationale for the Executions It Supports, 35 
AM. J. CRIM. L. 145, 152 (2008). 
 249 See Lahny R. Silva, Clean Slate: Expanding Expungements and Pardons for Non-Violent 
Federal Offenders, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 155, 199 (2010) (“[R]ecidivism rates among non-violent of-
fenders decline with the passage of time.”). 
 250 131 S.Ct. 1229 (2011). 
 251 Id. at 1236. 
 252 Id. at 1242. 
 253 Id. 
 254 Id. 
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. . . .”255 For the Court, the defendant’s behavioral progress over time informed 
the prediction of future criminality. 
Risk-assessment tools, however, would have instructed a court to sen-
tence Pepper more harshly (e.g., imprisonment or a longer term of imprison-
ment) because of his younger age, substance abuse, unemployment, and weak 
family ties—which all indicate a higher risk of recidivating.256 It is true that a 
new risk profile may be calculated at different stages of the criminal justice 
process, such as bail-setting to sentencing, and thus changes in the individual 
may be reflected in newer risk profile. But, as Pepper’s situation shows, certain 
traits are fixed and even revised risk scores will build-in the higher risk predic-
tions called for by these traits and thereby point to a greater form and/or length 
of sanction. The individual’s ability to advance is held back at each stage, a 
Zeno’s paradox in which the individual’s ability to reach a sufficient point of 
personal development is continuously frustrated. 
Prison, unfortunately, is a difficult place that compromises this personal 
transformation. Indeed, Congress itself has expressed that the penal environ-
ment is not conducive to rehabilitation. The SRA flatly states that “imprison-
ment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and rehabilita-
tion.”257 Yet risk-assessments tools often call for an offender to be detained—
sometimes for lengthy periods—because he or she risks recidivating. “Risk-
assessment tools that support custodial detention could not only impede the 
individual’s development, but could even send him or her in the opposite direc-
tion. Empirical evidence bears this out. For example, when low-risk defendants 
are “detained pretrial, they are more likely to commit new crimes both in the 
near and long term,” and that this cycle “carries enormous costs—both human 
and financial.”258 
The individual’s subsequent failure to reform—arguably facilitated by 
sentences supported by risk-assessment tools—would be a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. Furthermore, that assisted failure would in turn validate risk-
assessments for being “right” about the analyzed individual. Risk-assessments 
minimize the criminal justice system’s interest in investing in an offender 
deemed statistically high-risk.259 The sentencer not only actively impairs the 
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 256 See Oleson, supra note 134, at 1351. 
 257 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (2012). 
 258 LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., RESEARCH SUMMARY, DEVELOPING A NATIONAL MODEL 
FOR PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT 2 (Nov. 2013), available at http://arnoldfoundation.org/sites/
default/files/pdf/LJAF-research-summary_PSA-Court_4_1.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5TMA-
583F. 
 259 See Underwood, supra note 218, at 1417 (“[T]he decisionmaker [is] discouraged from acting 
to improve the chances of the people identified as bad risks. A decisionmaker who selects and ex-
cludes individuals on the basis of their predicted behavior tends to view the prediction as a fixed at-
tribute of the applicant, and tends not to consider ways of intervening to change the situation.”). 
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offender’s prospects for development by choosing to detain him or her, but 
then neglects his or her development because the offender is too risky and thus 
“not worth it.” Risk-assessments can thus “track”—grouping individuals based 
on lower expectations of future performance, and providing diminished sup-
port in light of those expectations—criminal defendants under the cover of 
statistical rationality.260 
In acknowledging that numbers accurately capture individuals’ rates of 
recidivism, it must be cautioned that numbers don’t tell the whole story: 
[T]he system spews out on the back-end of convictions nothing bet-
ter than what’s taken in on the front end. It would clearly suggest 
that people of color are more prone to be criminals in the first place, 
and more prone to recidivism afterward. That’s the story the num-
bers tell. But the numbers are only as good as the input. 
More young black men are recidivists because more black men are 
arrested, even though there is evidence that they don’t commit more 
crimes than white men. They just get arrested more, because they 
are who the police spend their time arresting. This gives rise to an 
internal community spiral, missing fathers (because they’re in pris-
on), poor education, poor job prospects, etc. Toss in a criminal con-
viction and ask empiricism why they aren’t being hired for well-
paying jobs at IBM.261 
Individuals can beat the odds, averages notwithstanding, as the Pepper 
case illustrates. Moreover, we should want individuals to beat the odds.262 We 
should want individuals to be productive. We should seek to help facilitate the 
development of the individual such that he or she can be part of mainstream 
society upon release.263 In fact, this is imperative because almost all offenders 
will be released back into our communities.264 
                                                                                                                           
 260 See Daniel J. Losen, Silent Segregation in our Nation’s Schools, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
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It is true that, as a general matter, individual development, typified by re-
habilitation, has fallen out of favor in American sentencing.265 But Congress 
codified rehabilitation as a purpose of sentencing in the SRA266 and as such 
indicated that transformative considerations should inform, at least to some 
degree, sentencing in the federal courts. That is, individual progress over time 
may no longer be a dominant goal of punishment, but it cannot be disregarded 
wholesale. The Supreme Court has recognized, for example, juveniles’ 
“heightened capacity for change,” a capacity that exists, albeit perhaps not to 
the same degree, for adults.267 Given this, the possibility that risk-assessment 
tools might stunt the capacity for exercising choice is troubling, and should 
perhaps temper their use. 
This section’s argument is of course utilitarian in nature. It need not re-
cruit retribution as a side constraint on utilitarianism. This is because the utili-
tarian theory recognizes changeover time and it is the offender’s change in 
threat to public safety that marks the beginning and end of the applicable 
timeframe. He or she is a sufficient danger to public safety at time-x, warrant-
ing punishment, but his or her threat-level is diminished at time-y, such that 
punishment is no longer warranted and release is appropriate. That change is 
in—and can only be attributed to—the offender. 
* * * 
In summary, risk-assessment tools that predict recidivism through group 
characteristics are problematic for three independent reasons: first, the Equal 
Protection Clause would prohibit, and the SRA expressly forbids, certain fac-
tors from use in sentencing. Second, even if these factors are not prohibited on 
constitutional or statutory grounds, risk-assessment tools premise sentencing 
decisions on group identity rather than on individual action or that which the 
individual can meaningfully control. Third, risk-assessment tools require that 
the individual be construed as a static entity predisposed to re-offend, without 
regard to the individual’s prospects for change, and with the effect of making 
the individual’s development a more distant possibility. 
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 264 See Sentences Imposed, supra note 251 (noting that 97.2% of inmates are eligible for release). 
 265 See Tapia v. United States, 131 S.Ct. 2382, 2387 (2011). 
 266 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D) (2012). Outside of Congress, the model is still viable. See Editorial, 
Writing Off Lives, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2013, at A24 (suggesting that long-term imprisonment for 
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 267 See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).  
718 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:671 
IV. APPLYING LIMITS TO RISK-ASSESSMENT TRAITS 
This Part applies the three principles enumerated in Part III to the major 
factors used in risk-assessment tools. Section A analyzes seventeen major risk-
assessment factors and argues that each of these traits should be off-limits for 
risk-assessment purposes. Section B responds to potential criticisms to this 
argument. 
A. Analyzing Risk-Assessment Factors 
1. Traits Prohibited by Law 
The first step is rather straightforward: it is impermissible under the Equal 
Protection Clause to use race, sex, national origin, or religion as a factor in 
risk-assessment tools. The use of these traits is presumptively unconstitutional, 
and the limited permissible purposes carved out by the Supreme Court, includ-
ing responding to imminent public safety emergencies, cannot be read to en-
compass a general public safety goal.268 In addition, the SRA, by its own 
terms, states that the federal sentencing policy shall be “entirely neutral” as to 
these four factors as well as to socio-economic status.269 Five of the seventeen 
may therefore be comfortably removed from consideration in predictive in-
struments. 
2. Traits Outside Individual Conduct and Control 
Risk-assessment tools rely on data that specific groups recidivate at cer-
tain rates and assign the same risk profile to each member of the group. But as 
discussed above, this approach raises significant concerns by treating each in-
dividual in a group as a monolithic entity. These concerns apply to each of the 
seventeen factors, which are all premised on averages and do not take into ac-
count individualized variations within a group. 
In addition to a prediction of recidivism, risk assessment tools assign a fu-
ture dangerousness score to an individual solely because the individual has a 
characteristic that is shared with others in the group. But as discussed above, 
the individual may not have any control over the characteristics that form the 
basis for the group membership. Subjecting an individual to punishment for 
immutable traits severs the fundamental link between punishment and individ-
ual conduct that the criminal law demands. 
Race, sex, national origin, and age. Traits that the individual cannot con-
trol include race, sex, national origin, and age. The inability of the individual 
to control his or her race, sex, national origin, or age requires no elaboration. 
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Criminal behavior of family members, family rearing practices, family 
structure. Offenders also cannot control traits relating to family: the criminality 
of family members, family rearing practices (i.e., “lack of supervision and af-
fection, abuse”),270 and family structure (i.e., “separation from parents, broken 
home, foster parents”).271 Individuals cannot, of course, choose their family 
members (outside of marriage and children). Assigning blame, therefore, be-
cause of the conduct of a family member is fundamentally improper—and our 
law recognizes this. For example, the Supreme Court has admonished that pun-
ishing a child for the actions of his or her parents is “illogical,” “unjust,” and 
“contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear 
some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing.”272 Accordingly, 
individuals should not be punished for the actions, moral failures, or the abuse 
or neglect visited upon them by others, since the individual cannot control oth-
ers’ actions or the existence of the family relationship with these others. True, 
an individual may be able to control entry of some individuals, namely spouses 
and children, into the family. But risk-assessment tools do not hold individuals 
accountable for the actions of only these family members, but does so for all 
family members including those whose family membership is beyond the indi-
vidual’s control. 
Pre-adult criminal behavior, mental illness, and substance abuse. Forbid-
den traits also should include pre-adult criminality. The Supreme Court has 
held that criminal responsibility attaches when the defendant can meaningfully 
exercise choice. According to the Court, the diminished capacity of children 
undermines the penological value of a defendant’s pre-adult actions.273 Relat-
edly, the Supreme Court has instructed that a defendant’s mental illness or sub-
stance abuse may diminish the defendant’s culpability, though these factors 
indicate a higher likelihood of recidivating.274 (Though the Court, in the same 
breath, has cautioned that such illness or abuse may also lead jurors to believe 
that such a defendant poses a heightened risk to public safety and therefore 
requires even greater penal attention).275 While these factors are a double-edge 
                                                                                                                           
 270 Paul Gendreau et al., A Meta-Analysis of the Predictors of Adult Offender Recidivism: What 
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sword in terms of culpability and future dangerousness, risk-assessment tools 
seek to have it only one way, treating the factors as categorically aggravating. 
To make either of these traits per se aggravating, despite the fact that they may 
cut either way, essentially eliminates individualized determinations as to the 
appropriateness of criminal sanction. 
Socio-economic status. Individuals are not able to glide at will through 
different socio-economic classes. In fact, the reality of economic stagnation 
and impoverishment signal the exact opposite: many individuals are effectively 
stuck in their social situations and physical locations.276 For example, socio-
logical analyses show that individuals in areas of concentrated urban poverty 
have great difficulty achieving social mobility.277 Despite the fact that individ-
uals may not be able to meaningfully control their socio-economic status, risk-
assessments treat this status as categorically relevant because of its high corre-
lation with recidivism. As this factor would subject the individual to higher 
punishment on the basis of conditions the individual cannot meaningfully con-
trol, the factor must be disregarded in risk-assessments, regardless of its statis-
tical validity. 
Criminal companions. The “criminal companions” factor is also related to 
socio-economic status. Some individuals, because of their depressed economic 
state, may not have the ability or resources to “extricate themselves from 
a criminogenic setting.”278 Indeed, the salience of having criminal companions, 
another major factor that correlates with future dangerousness, is questionable 
for two reasons. First, as the conspiracy doctrine makes clear, whether an indi-
vidual’s companions engage (or don’t engage) in criminal action means little 
for legal purposes, unless the individual himself or herself signs on to the crim-
inal enterprise. To the extent that an individual may be held accountable for the 
criminality of others, it is because the individual has exercised choice in 
whether or not to join the conspiracy. An individual may not, without more, be 
subject to punishment merely on the basis of associating with others.279 It was 
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Tocqueville who recognized that “[t]he right of association . . . appears . . . al-
most as inalienable in its nature as the right of personal liberty. No legislator 
can attack it without impairing the foundations of society.”280 
Second, individuals who live in areas of concentrated poverty unjustifi-
ably face the prospect of an adverse risk profile—and the harsher punishment 
that typically follows. These individuals, due to their limited physical mobility, 
may be stuck—they have little choice but to associate with individuals around 
them, even those who are criminals. But risk-assessment tools fail to recognize 
these problems and would ensnare anyone in or around an area with criminals. 
This remains true even for individuals who do not engage in the critical step of 
affirmatively supporting the criminal activity or inclinations of others. 
Education and vocational skills, employment record, and community ties. 
In the SRA, Congress declared that the following factors are generally inap-
propriate in determining whether and how long to imprison an offender: “edu-
cation, vocational skills, employment record, family ties and responsibilities, 
and community ties . . . .”281 There may be special circumstances in which the 
general rule does not govern and these factors do become relevant in sentenc-
ing, as the Supreme Court stated in Koon.282 But risk-assessment tools would 
make these factors categorically relevant in sentencing irrespective of the cir-
cumstances of the individual, thus offending both Congress’s statutory deter-
mination and the Court’s ruling in Koon. 
Religion and anti-social attitudes and personality. Similarly, risk-
assessment tools should not rely on religion or anti-social attitudes or personal-
ity. Criminal responsibility cannot exist when an individual does not act, and 
as a result cannot be based on what or how someone thinks. Religious views 
and anti-social sentiments are intrinsically internal in nature and should remain 
immune from criminal punishment, unless those thoughts indicate an actual or 
imminent threat to public safety.283 Moreover, an individual’s ideology, atti-
tude, and life decisions, such as whether to get married or pursue higher educa-
tion, are the type of “personal and private choices” that are reserved for the 
individual.284 Choices that reflect an individual’s autonomy should not open up 
the individual to punishment, provided that the decisions remain within the 
bounds of the law. 
Adult criminal history. The final characteristic of the seventeen is adult 
criminal history. It is true that adult criminal history, as with all other factors, is 
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vulnerable to the charge that risk-assessments designate a blanket risk profile 
to all members of a group and fail to identify the risk of recidivism for individ-
uals within a group. Other considerations, however, mitigate these concerns 
and would allow risk-assessments to make use of adult criminal history. First, 
adult criminal history most reflects individual choice and what the individual 
can control, as adult criminal history is based on criminal violations committed 
with sufficient mental maturity. Second, individuals who have failed to bring 
their conduct within the bounds of the law, despite past corrective action taken 
by the criminal justice system, reveal themselves as particularly in need of ad-
ditional help to make lawful choices.285 Accordingly, adult criminal history 
may be appropriately used for predictive purposes without punishing offenders 
for traits outside of their control. 
3. Traits That Undermine Individual Autonomy 
The last overarching concern with risk-assessment tools is that they un-
dermine the ability of individuals to exercise autonomy and develop over time. 
Risk-assessments are in tension with individual autonomy for two reasons: 
first, risk-assessments do not contemplate the ability of the individual to exer-
cise choice and defeat his or her recidivism prediction; second, and arguably 
worse, risk-assessments may authorize greater punishment and in doing so 
make it less likely that the individual will be able to progress from the time of 
sentence to the time of release. Indeed, Congress has recognized that the more 
an individual is punished, the less likely the individual will rehabilitate.286 Ac-
cordingly, in supporting more stringent punishment, and thereby moving the 
rehabilitative goalposts further out from the individual, risk-assessments may 
actually facilitate the recidivism of the individual and simultaneously reinforce 
the validity of recidivism statistics. This general concern does not depend on 
the particular risk factor at issue and therefore applies to risk-based assess-
ments as a whole. 
As adult criminal history is the only factor that survives the previous 
analyses, this Article addresses here only whether this factor adequately recog-
nizes individual autonomy. People change over time—that much is undisputed. 
As Pepper makes clear, an individual at release may be materially different 
from that same person at sentencing. An individual who commits a crime at 
age eighteen may be the same person in body and name at age thirty, forty, or 
fifty, but may be someone else entirely in other respects. 
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Criminal law reflects this potential for internal development. Take the 
Sentencing Guidelines’ chapter on criminal history as an example. Pursuant to 
this chapter, criminal sentences exceeding one year and one day that are more 
than fifteen years old are not added to an offender’s criminal history points for 
Guidelines calculation purposes.287 Nor are criminal sentences of at least sixty 
days if those sentences are more than ten years old.288 Other criminal sentences 
not covered by these two exclusions are not counted if they are more than ten 
years old.289 The reasons why these outdated sentences are not counted is ra-
ther simple: they do not accurately capture the individual’s current threat to 
society, and an individual’s “desert” for prior crimes has grown stale. In other 
words, the older sentences may not be indicative of the internal progress that 
the offender has made over time. 
Conduct that may have happened many years ago may be relevant if it is 
similar to the type of conduct presently at issue. The Sentencing Guidelines, 
for example, enable a judge to count these older sentences towards the offend-
er’s criminal history if the older conviction is “similar” to the current of-
fense.290 The courts have taken an identical approach. In United States v. 
Lucero, for example, a federal appeals court recognized that a defendant’s ad-
mission that he sexually touched his eight or ten year old nieces over thirty-
five years ago was relevant for purposes of sentencing for his child pornogra-
phy convictions, despite the significant time that had passed.291 
But risk-assessment tools using adult criminal history may not make use 
of these critical temporal and qualitative limitations. Take, as an example, a 
widely-discussed November 2013 study. The study suggests that a risk-
assessment instrument consisting of factors related only to criminal history is 
an accurate predictor of future criminal activity.292 In the study, four statistical-
ly significant factors related to criminal history were used: 1) does the defend-
ant have prior misdemeanor convictions, 2) does the defendant have prior fel-
ony convictions, 3) does the defendant have prior violent crime convictions, 
and 4) is the defendant currently on probation/parole from a felony convic-
tion?293 
This predictive tool, however, does not confine the adult criminal history 
to convictions that are relevant either in time or type. For the usage of adult 
criminal history to avoid encroaching on individual autonomy, risk-assessment 
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tools may use adult criminal history only if there are temporal and qualitative 
limitations akin to those found in the Sentencing Guidelines. The unqualified 
use of adult criminal history does not contemplate the possibility that individu-
als may change over time and potentially reduce their threat to the public and 
their need for moral “desert.” To punish individuals for their past actions, 
without the requisite meaningful connection to those incidents, would have the 
consequence of needlessly placing the offender in Zeno’s paradox and render-
ing his or her internal progress a more distant prospect. 
Where does this analysis lead us? On the one hand, a judge can take into 
account any and all factors in order to develop a sense of an individual’s future 
dangerousness and determine whether and how long the individual should be 
sentenced to prison or sent to a diversion program. On the other hand, a judge 
can make these decisions according to the underlying offense for which the 
individual was arrested or convicted, without regard to the offender’s charac-
teristics. 
In fact, neither of these extreme positions is viable. The former, judge-
centric approach would invite the sort of subjectivity that facilitates sentencing 
disparities and impressions of unfairness in sentencing.294 The latter, offense-
centric approach would be consistent with sentencing at the time of the found-
ing, but would be inconsistent with modern sentencing’s preference for pun-
ishment to be tailored to the particularized circumstances at hand.295 This reali-
ty highlights the inherent tension between uniformity and individualization. 
The proper balance must be found in the middle ground between the opposite 
ends of the spectrum. 
In an effort to find this middle ground, predictions of risk should include 
only those factors over which the individual has actual or meaningful control, 
and that reflect the possibility that the individual may change over time. Ap-
plied to seventeen major characteristics, all seventeen are problematic—yet 
adult criminal history may be used with the proper temporal and qualitative 
limitations. Utilitarian considerations, Supreme Court opinions, the SRA, and 
Sentencing Guidelines all support these restrictions on actuarial predictive in-
struments. 
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B. Responses to Potential Counter-Arguments 
This argument may provoke several critical responses, which this Article 
will attempt to anticipate and mollify. 
First, empiricists may argue that risk-assessment tools are a mechanism 
by which to improve sentencing by replacing clinical or judicial intuition with 
objective statistical data, allowing courts to reliably differentiate between low-
risk and high-risk offenders and allocate limited resources towards those who 
need them most. Similarly, they may claim that the factors that this Article has 
brushed aside are not only useful in this risk-prediction enterprise, but their 
predictive value only enhances when the factors are used in the aggregate and 
interact with one another.296 
To this, this Article would remind the reader that the statistical superiority 
of risk-assessment tools has been assumed here. Others already have praised 
factors that this Article has discarded.297 That is to say, this Article acknowl-
edges that the factors reliably track risk, yet nonetheless diagnoses principled 
problems with these factors, whether used in isolation or in some combination. 
The statistical significance of the factors cannot be viewed in a vacuum—there 
are legal and theoretical considerations that also must be taken into account.298 
Put directly, the use of risk-assessment instruments in the criminal justice sys-
tem must arise from the theories of punishment and the law, not simply be spit 
out by a printer or entered on a database. This Article suggests that jurispru-
dential and legal considerations trump whatever statistical advantages may be 
derived from the use of the problematic factors. 
Second, some concerned with the “positive” promise of risk-based as-
sessments—that they help the sentencer identify low-risk offenders who 
should not be in prison, who should be in a prison for a shorter term, or who 
should be sent to a diversion program—may argue that, under this Article’s 
proposal, individuals will not be able to benefit from risk-assessment tools, and 
instead will needlessly languish in prison without presenting any real risk of 
recidivating, and that taxpayer dollars will be misallocated as a result. Accord-
ing to these critics, for every factor that is excluded, individuals who would be 
high risk under that factor may be saved from the adverse consequences, but 
individuals who may be low risk according to that same factor would lose out 
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on favorable consequences stemming from the low risk score. They also would 
observe that, in general, this Article has focused on the “negative” side of the 
use of risk-assessment tools: their use to justify increased punishment, as op-
posed to their use to minimize punishment. 
This Article accepts the charge as to the “negative” orientation of this Ar-
ticle. Some have stated already that predictive techniques should be used only 
to reduce punishment and not enhance it.299 Judge Wolff writes that “the sever-
ity of a punishment should not be based on a risk-assessment prediction.”300 
Another scholar writes that “actuarial tools are on firmer legal ground when 
used as shields rather than as swords.”301 The commentary to the draft revi-
sions to the Model Penal Code similarly counsels “skepticism and restraint” 
with respect to “the use of high-risk predictions as a basis of elongated prison 
terms,” and endorses “the use of low-risk predictions as grounds for diverting 
otherwise prison-bound offenders to less onerous penalties.”302 In reality, how-
ever, risk-assessments are not limited to sentence reduction; they remain open 
to use for sentence enhancement.303 As a result, the understandable preference 
for the positive use of actuarial instruments does not eliminate the very real 
possibility that these instruments may be used in both directions.304 
Moreover, considerations of individual control and social equity demand 
a negative-centric approach. Whereas risk-assessment tools, left untouched, 
would ostensibly enhance punishment for some and minimize punishment for 
others, this Article suggests that only factors that reflect individual control and 
choice should be included in risk assessment. If only those factors are includ-
ed, all individuals would have a similar starting point in their risk score, and 
any deviation from that starting point could be fairly attributed only to the 
meaningful choices of the individual. In practical terms, it is true that this pro-
posal would mean that a white, rich, educated person would not get the benefit 
of the application of unmodified risk-assessment tools, which may, for exam-
ple, counsel against pre-trial detention, for diversion programs, or for less pris-
on time. It would mean, however, that a poor black person would not face pre-
trial detention, imprisonment, or a longer term of imprisonment due to irrele-
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vant racial and wealth characteristics.305 In the end, this proposal means that, 
for both of these people, their sentences would be adjusted on the basis of what 
they have done (the instant offense) and what they have done in the past (their 
relevant adult criminal history), not on characteristics unconnected to their ac-
tions.306 In this sense, the values of individual choice in criminal law and equi-
ty are better served.307 
Third, some may react to the concern that risk-assessment tools ascribe a 
monolithic risk profile to individuals in a group by recommending a blended 
approach that combines the actuarial and clinical models. Under this approach, 
“Actuarial data could establish a ‘base rate’ for violent behavior for a popula-
tion with given characteristics” and then clinical assessments would “discern 
whether a member of this particular group diverged from the group norm be-
cause of characteristics not included in the statistical survey.”308 This creative 
approach is intuitively appealing, though it could only be applied to character-
istics that are amenable to divergence (e.g., not race, national origin, sex, age). 
Yet more fundamentally, this combined strategy seems to expose the unneeded 
nature of risk-assessments: why not probe individual action directly instead of 
determining whether the individual departs from the group? Moreover, even 
those characteristics that can be changed in theory may still be problematic, as 
adult criminal history unlimited by time shows. 
Fourth, proponents of data-driven sentencing schemes may lament the 
fact that copious statistical information would have little place in sentencing 
under this Article’s proposal. That is not true. This Article suggests that the use 
of actuarial instruments should be significantly circumscribed for purposes of 
assessing risk and informing sentencing decisions on imprisonment. It would 
allow, however, the use of predictive data to identify offenders’ needs and to 
determine thereby what programs should be afforded to offenders to facilitate 
their rehabilitation and reduce the likelihood that they will re-offend.309 For 
example, Attorney General Holder stated that “[d]ata can also help design 
paths for federal inmates to lower [their] risk assessments, and earn their way 
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towards a reduced sentence, based on participation in programs that research 
shows can dramatically improve the odds of successful reentry.”310 These ap-
proaches, he continued, “hold the potential to revolutionize community correc-
tions and make our system far more effective than it is today,” including “by 
better matching services with needs . . . .”311 Two other senior government of-
ficials observed recently, “With today’s sophisticated assessment tools, we can 
better sort offenders and match them with the levels of treatment and commu-
nity supervision that offer the best chance for them to stay crime free,”312 a call 
whose language corresponds with needs assessment. 
Kansas offers a concrete example of how data may be re-purposed. Re-
cidivism rates in the state dropped dramatically from fifty-seven percent in 
2000 to thirty-three percent in 2013, in large part because Kansas has adopted 
a mentoring program: the state uses data to identify offenders at risk for recidi-
vism and then “matches community volunteers with prisoners who are within a 
few months of getting out . . . .”313 These mentors “help new parolees get men-
tal health appointments, find work and ‘guidance to get through rough times,’” 
according to the Kansas Department of Corrections Secretary.314 
Fifth, and relatedly, some may worry that this Article spells the return of a 
rehabilitation-centric system in which indeterminate sentencing will be the 
norm. These critics may recall that disparities in sentencing were a by-product 
of a discretionary sentencing system.315 Granted, this Article joins Congress in 
advocating rehabilitation as a legitimate part of sentencing in the criminal jus-
tice system. ’Its approach would not, however, trigger unjustified disparities 
because modern, rehabilitation-oriented sentencing would be guided by the 
actual conduct of the individual. 
Sixth, some may point to other risk-prediction innovations that do not rely 
on such factors and ask what room there may be for these technological ad-
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vancements under this Article’s rubric. For example, a recent study suggests 
that brain scans can accurately predict recidivism.316 This Article would assert 
that the use of these “biomarkers” in risk-assessments would be inappropriate 
as they are not predicated on individual action, potentially punish the individu-
al for that which the offender cannot meaningfully control, and presume that 
the individual cannot act other than how his or her scans dictate. Otherwise, 
sentencing would venture into “pre-crime” territory,317 would break the link 
between crime and action, and would undermine the autonomy of the individ-
ual. As Daskal suggests, these “restraints can only be justified by a purely de-
terministic view of individual action or a decision that respect for moral auton-
omy needs to give way to a different set of interests, such as protection of the 
nation’s or community’s safety.”318 
Finally, actuarial tools have been quite helpful outside of the sentencing 
arena, for example in detecting who may be prone to certain diseases and thus 
take preventative health measures.319 Some may ask whether the arguments in 
this Article would question the use of actuarial tools for non-sentencing pur-
poses.320 The short response is “no.” This Article’s arguments regarding the 
legality and propriety of actuarial tools are limited to the sentencing context. 
Sentencing can be distinguished from other areas in which actuarial tools may 
be applied because the use of actuarial tools here implicates whether the gov-
ernment may restrict the liberty of the individual.321 In other words, the appli-
cation of actuarial methods in sentencing is qualitatively different than its use 
in other aspects of society. Its collateral consequences, on employment and 
potentially initiating a cycle of interacting with the criminal justice system, are 
unique and especially debilitating as well.322 
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CONCLUSION 
Just as the Oakland Athletics were motivated by modest salary capabili-
ties, the criminal justice community has recognized that its prisons are too 
costly and crowded. Just as the A’s had little room for error and sought to min-
imize risk in its personnel decisions, the criminal justice community is inter-
ested in allocating its scarce resources efficiently and minimizing risk in who it 
releases to the public. Just as the A’s needed to identify the potential stars 
(whom the A’s would select or sign) from the potential duds (whom the A’s 
would pass over), the criminal justice community needs to distinguish between 
those individuals who pose a higher likelihood of recidivating (whom the sys-
tem will assign greater attention) and individuals who present a smaller likeli-
hood of re-offending (who would give the system less concern). Just as the A’s 
turned to statistical evidence of past performance as the basis for projecting 
which players would perform well in the future, the criminal justice system has 
seized on actuarial methods for predicting which individuals may return to 
criminal activity later on. Just as major league teams have incorporated statis-
tical analyses in their personnel decision-making, states and scholars are em-
bracing evidence-based sentencing practices. 
At bottom, this Article has explored what happens when the starting point 
for an analysis of risk prediction moves from the risk principle to the theories 
of punishment. The risk principle, as noted by proponents of actuarial risk-
assessments, is the belief that “the level of correctional intervention should 
match the client’s risk of recidivism.”323 The theories of punishment, by con-
trast, suggest that the level of correctional intervention should flow from the 
reasons why the state may legitimately impose punishment on an individual. 
Those reasons dictate an alternative set of values that are in tension with the 
pragmatic benefits of risk-assessment tools. To paraphrase The Wire’s Lester 
Freamon,324 you follow the risk principle, you get efficiency and empirical 
support. But you follow the theories of punishment, and you get individual 
action and agency. 
This Article acknowledges the temptation to switch from a predictive sys-
tem characterized as subjective and impressionistic to one that is purportedly 
objective and evidence-based. Several states and the ALI are on board with this 
transition. As the attraction of these tools increases, so does their reach over 
criminal defendants, which numbered over twenty million in 2013 alone.325 
                                                                                                                           
 323 PCRA OVERVIEW, supra note 115, at 3. 
 324 “You follow drugs, you get drug addicts and drug dealers. But you start to follow the money, 
and you don’t know where the fuck it’s going to take you.” The Wire: Gameday (HBO television 
broadcast Aug. 4, 2002). 
 325 See Criminal Caseloads Continue to Decline, COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, http://www.
courtstatistics.org/Criminal/20121Criminal.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/8V3B-VVUN (last visit-
ed Mar. 11, 2015); see also Table D-1, U.S. District Courts—Criminal Defendants Commenced, Ter-
2015] Actuarial Predictive Instruments in Sentencing 731 
For these offenders, their families, and their communities, the salience of these 
tools matters in real terms because they can influence pivotal sentencing out-
comes. 
An excitement over the objective, evidence-based benefits of risk-
assessment tools may cause us to neglect whatever may tend to dampen the 
legal viability of promising innovations. When those overlooked concepts are 
of a fundamental order, and are in particular the very reasons why the state 
may punish the individual, it is critical to restate their existence and revive 
their consideration. This Article may help ensure that the stated benefits of ev-
idence-based practices flourish, but, as they must, do so within bedrock legal 
and principled limits. 
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